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The influence of social media in the 21st century has led to new 
social norms of behavior with individuals presenting themselves to 
others, whether physically or virtually, on various social media plat-
forms. As a result, these new trends have led recent society to be 
characterized as a “presentational cultural regime” and a “specu-
lar economy.” In a Bakhtinian digital carnivalesque, internet 
memes present a feast of challenges to exceptions and limitations in 
copyright law. Memes encompass a wide range of expression about 
the human experience, while also existing as a playful mode of cul-
turally permissible expression in online social communications ra-
ther than as self-contained and specific categories such as parody 
or satire. This Article analyzes how, and to what extent, internet 
memes should be protected by the fair use doctrine. It concludes that 
as the digital intercommunicative persona construction becomes 
pandemic in the contemporary moment, more and more images will 
inevitably become the raw materials in the online making and re-
making of the public self in an anti-hierarchical networked commu-
nity. Copyright law is slowly and belatedly learning a new cultural 
vocabulary that it needs to translate into a legal lexicon relevant to 
judges and lawmakers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Internet memes provide a cogent example of how cultural ex-
pression shapes and is shaped by digital technology, which demon-
strates the constant challenge of reconciling social norms of online 
communication with the fair use doctrine in copyright law. Recent 
society has been described with terms such as “presentational cul-
tural regime” and “specular economy.”1 These characterizations re-
flect how the influence of social media in the 21st Century has led to 
new social norms of behavior where individuals present themselves 
to others, whether physically or virtually, on various social media 
platforms and impels innovative economic models. The digital 
 
1 P. DAVID MARSHALL, THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC 5, 37 (2016) [hereinafter 
“THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC”]; P. David Marshall, The Specular Economy: 
Celebrity, Two-Way Mirrors, and the Personalization of Renown, 47(6) SOC’Y 498 (2010) 
[hereinafter “The Specular Economy”]. 
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culture has led to a pronounced focus on the production of the self 
or an online persona—whether through Facebook, Instagram, 
LinkedIn, Twitter, or Pinterest, billions of individuals worldwide are 
constantly making and remaking public versions of themselves for 
myriad purposes and monitoring these profiles daily. David Mar-
shall observes that: 
[T]he new technologies of the social—such as Face-
book, Instagram, and Twitter—position the individ-
ual differently in the chain of communication, in the 
organization of engagement, and in the play of con-
nection . . . we are on a spectrum of presentation of 
the self . . . producing our personas for publics.2 
Social media inherently encourages the production of the online 
public persona that resembles the serialization of fictional characters 
in a television or movie series.3 Individuals are using a combination 
of images, videos, text, handles and hashtags on social media to con-
struct their online identities. Indeed “[t]hrough the circulation of vi-
ral images, texts, and videos . . . [and] memes, we replicate and se-
riate content that at some level seriates personas in terms of humor, 
connection, and value.”4 
As the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the world and govern-
ments enforced draconian lockdown measures, individuals have 
stormed social media to express their frustration, anger, and des-
pair.5 The proliferation of memes and parody videos on YouTube 
provide humorous outlets to convey our emotions and criticisms of 
political leaders and government agencies in their handling of the 
pandemic.6 Images and videos are widely shared and reposted, often 
 
2 THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC, supra note 1, at 39. 
3 For a discussion, see id. at 48–63. 
4 Id. at 63. 
5 E.g., Casey Schwartz, Is Everybody Doing…OK? Let’s Ask Social Media, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/style/self-care/social-media-.html 
[https://perma.cc/S365-DPTN]; Koustuv Saha, John Torous, Eric D. Caine, & Munmun 
De Choundhury, Psychosocial Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Large-Scale Quasi-
Experimental Study on Social Media, 22(11) J. MED. INTERNET RES. (2020), 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33156805/ [https://perma.cc/8267-VV2H]. 
6 See, e.g., Olivia Blair, 230 Coronavirus Memes To Get You Through Self-Isolation 
and Social Distancing, ELLE (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.elle.com/uk/life-and-
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at breakneck speed. Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of “carnival laugh-
ter” provides an apropos lens through which we can view these be-
havior on social media “as a spectacular feast of inversion and par-
ody of high culture.”7 The cult theory of carnival culture first es-
poused by Bakhtin in his book Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics is 
a familiar one to many scholars of literature, culture and political 
science.8 There is a tendency on social media for a different set of 
rules to operate, one “in which anti-hierarchism, relativity of values, 
questioning of authority, openness, joyous anarchy, and the ridicul-
ing of all dogmas hold sway.”9 Other scholars have already invoked 
Bakhtin’s analytical paradigm of the carnivalesque to explain the 
presidential campaign of Donald Trump,10 and have suggested that 
fair use can represent carnivalesque resistance to the hierarchies in-
herent in copyright law.11 This Article, however, goes further to pos-
tulate that the notion of the carnivalesque as applied to social media 
platforms does not require the creative practices to be modes of ex-
pression that present a resistance to authority, but merely one that 
embodies performance as “a spectacle seen by the people [where] 
they live in it, and [where] everyone participates because its very 
idea embraces all the people.”12 
Images posted or circulated on social media have arguably  
the same purpose as the “social photograph” in the manner 
 
culture/g31803505/coronavirus-social-distancing-memes/ [https://perma.cc/A693-QP72]; 
Abram Brown, Laugh Away the Apocalypse with These 15 Coronavirus Memes, FORBES 
(Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2020/03/21/laugh-away-the-
apocalypse-with-these-15-coronavirus-memes/?sh=505a831723fc 
[https://perma.cc/SXE8-CF6E]; CDC Coronavirus Guidelines (Parody), YOUTUBE (Mar. 
24, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x503AEbk-TU [https://perma.cc/J649-
ARHT]. 
7 Renate Lachmann, Bakhtin and Carnival: Culture as Counter-Culture, 11 CULTURAL 
CRITIQUE 115, 118 (Raoul Eshelman & Marc Davis, trans., 1988-89). 
8 MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY’S POETICS (Caryl Emerson, ed. & 
trans., 1984). 
9 Lachmann, supra note 7, at 118. 
10 See, e.g., Elizaveta Gaufman, The Trump Carnival: Popular Appeal in the Age of 
Misinformation, 32(4) INT’L RELS. 410 (2018); Shaheed Nick Mohammed & Robert C. 
Trumpbour, The Carnivalesque in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign, PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. (2020) (forthcoming), available at (https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12658) 
[https://perma.cc/FK2C-WAP8]. 
11 Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fair Use as Resistance, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 377 (2019). 
12 MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND HIS WORLD 6, 7 (Helen Iswolsky, trans., 1984). 
868 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:864 
 
contemplated by Nathan Jurgenson; the image object itself is less its 
own end but a means of communicating an experience.13 The post-
ing of selfies, social photographs, and memes all form “part of an 
ongoing communication of who you are, what you are experiencing, 
the simple fact that you exist and are live doing things.”14 One of the 
authors of this Article previously argued that a well-known literary 
or artistic work does much more than simply educate, inform or en-
tertain; it also functions as a signifier of a set of signified meanings 
which are relevant to triggering the protection of the First Amend-
ment when used in particular expressive ways.15 Here, as part of a 
stream of continual postings—or in Marshall’s parlance, a serializa-
tion of an online public persona—photographs and memes form a 
nuanced visual literacy that plays with the distinction between the 
world of real objects and their symbolic meaning as a “means to 
express feelings, ideas, and experiences in the moment, a means 
sometimes more important than the specific ends of a particular im-
age.”16 These images transcend their original purpose in social me-
dia postings as they are utilized as raw materials and repurposed for 
their semiotic values in the serialized construction of the online  
public persona. 
As the digital intercommunicative persona construction be-
comes “pandemic in the contemporary moment”,17 more and more 
images, videos, and text will inevitably become the raw materials in 
the online making and remaking of the public self. Copyright law is 
slowly and belatedly learning a new cultural vocabulary that it needs 
to translate into a legal lexicon relevant to judges and lawmakers. 
But it is never too late to learn a new language. 
This Article analyzes how internet memes are protected by the 
fair use doctrine, and to what extent they should be, under U.S.  
copyright law. Internet memes present a nebulous challenge to 
 
13 NATHAN JURGENSON, THE SOCIAL PHOTO: ON PHOTOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL MEDIA 16–
17 (2019). 
14 Id. at 16. 
15 David Tan, The Lost Language of the First Amendment in Copyright Fair Use: A 
Semiotic Perspective of the “Transformative Use” Doctrine Twenty-Five Years On, 26 
FORDHAM INT. PROP, MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 316 (2016). 
16 JURGENSON, supra note 13, at 18. 
17 THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC, supra note 1, at 1. See also id. at 71–77. 
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exceptions and limitations in copyright law, as they encompass a 
wide range of expression about the human experience—they exist 
as a mode of culturally permissible expression in online social com-
munications rather than as self-contained and specific categories 
such as parody or satire. Memes are a pervasive form of expression 
online and may incorporate image or video elements. They are 
shared across a variety of internet platforms such as blogs, Face-
book, and Instagram as commentary or to further discourse. They 
rely on the viewer’s prior knowledge of a creative work or digital 
subculture to make the necessary semiotic connections, often draw-
ing from copyrighted works of popular culture such as films, televi-
sion series, paintings, or photographs. Ultimately, internet memes 
may be conceived as remixed, iterated discursive units of digital cul-
ture typified by rapid diffusion that inhere some form of commen-
tary, admittedly to widely varying degrees.18 
Part I considers the fair use doctrine in the U.S. and interrogates 
specifically how it is able to accommodate the notion of the carni-
valesque within the rubric of the First Amendment in its protection 
of expressive and symbolic speech. Part II explores the role of 
memes as a mode of expression in what may broadly be referred to 
as “digital culture” to demonstrate a lack of alignment between 
online cultural norms of use and the prevailing traditional under-
standing of copyright law. Part III applies fair use doctrine to differ-
ent categories of internet memes to determine the extent to which 
this genre of digital expression qualifies as fair use. The Article con-
cludes on a cautionary note, urging the US judiciary to embrace a 
culturally sensitive interpretation of the first factor of fair use espe-
cially when considering novel and overwhelmingly non-commercial 
secondary uses that do not visually transform the underlying work. 
 
 
18 BRADLEY E. WIGGINS, THE DISCURSIVE POWER OF MEMES IN DIGITAL CULTURE: 
IDEOLOGY, SEMIOTICS, AND INTERTEXTUALITY 11 (2019). 
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I. FAIR USE 
A. Contextualizing Fair Use within a Carnivalesque Cultural 
Milieu 
Copyright law is intended to promote creativity and innovation 
by providing fair compensation to copyright holders. However, the 
exclusive rights of the copyright holder give way to a user’s right 
allowing limited, unauthorized use of protected works to prevent 
these rights from stifling creativity and innovation. Open-ended fair 
use in the U.S. and categorical fair dealing provisions in other coun-
tries like the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia both operate to 
temper the exclusive rights of copyright owners with the public in-
terest to foster further creative expression by permitting secondary 
uses of copyrighted works,19 which provides the primary mecha-
nism to balance copyright protection with the broader public interest 
of fostering creative expression.20 In the U.S., the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals has led the charge in regarding the “public inter-
est” as a guiding consideration in conducting the overall fair use 
analysis: “transformative uses tend to favor a fair use finding  
because a transformative use is one that communicates something 
new and different from the original or expands its utility, thus  
serving copyright’s overall objective of contributing to public 
knowledge.”21 In a comprehensive analysis of policy clusters, Pam-
ela Samuelson has similarly concluded that the primary purpose of 
copyright is “to promote the public good, or as the U.S. Constitution 
puts it, ‘promote the [p]rogress of Science and useful Arts.’”22 
The Copyright Act, enacted by Congress under the authority of 
the U.S. Constitution’s Copyright Clause, grants individuals mo-
nopoly-like power to preclude others from using copyrighted mate-
rial in their expression.23 It is this “paradox” that creates the 
 
19 Emily Hudson, Implementing Fair Use in Copyright Law: Lessons from Australia, 25 
INTELL. PROP. J. 201 (2013). 
20 See e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
21 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015). See also Haochen 
Sun, Copyright Law as an Engine of Public Interest Protection, 16 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 123, 137–139 (2019). 
22 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Use, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2617 (2009). 
23 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
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tension—copyright laws grant a copyright owner the right to sup-
press or abridge another person’s freedom of speech when that per-
son seeks to express copyrighted material.24 However, on a number 
of occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected any further independ-
ent consideration of the impact of the First Amendment on copyright 
law, pronouncing that “copyright law contains built-in First Amend-
ment accommodations.”25 As a “traditional contour” of copyright 
law, the Court held that the “fair use defense affords considerable 
latitude for scholarship and comment . . . even for parody.”26 Justice 
Ginsburg delivering the opinion of the Court in Golan v. Holder em-
phasized the “speech-protective purposes and safeguards embraced 
by copyright law”27 and assured that the public may freely use the 
author’s expression “in certain circumstances.”28 Indeed the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Golan makes it clear that the fair use defense 
has “constitutional import” and “reaffirms that copyright law poses 
a First Amendment paradox that cannot be ignored.”29 
One may regard Golan v. Holder as recognizing copyright law 
as implicitly establishing a hierarchy that values certain kinds of 
works and authors/users/speakers over others by assigning different 
levels of protection and value to each of them. In the shadows of the 
First Amendment, original speakers (authors), derivative speakers 
(fair users and infringers) and the audience (general public and con-
sumers) are engaged in a communicative discourse.30 In his analysis 
of the potential of audience reconstruction with dominant symbols 
of a culture, John Fiske coined the term “semiotic democracy” to 
describe a world where empowered audiences freely and widely en-
gage in the use of cultural symbols to express meanings that are 
 
24 See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 3 (2010) (“Yet 
copyright also burdens speech. We often copy or build upon another’s words, images, or 
music to convey our own ideas effectively. We cannot do that if a copyright holder 
withholds permission or insists upon a license fee that is beyond our means.”). 
25 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). See also Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 
328 (2012); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
26 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–220. 
27 Golan, 565 U.S. at 328 (internal citations omitted). 
28 Id. (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219). 
29 Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. 
Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1128 (2013). 
30 Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 381. 
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different from the ones intended by their creators.31 As forms of re-
lational discourse, semiotics and the theory of intertextuality are in-
timately intertwined. Bakhtin viewed the products of authorship as 
reliant on, and inevitably inflected with, both the author’s voice and 
the voices of others—ultimately a dialogic practice.32 Bakhtin has 
emphasized that the “utterance” is always the site of ideological con-
testation and that there will always be a constant struggle over the 
sign.33 Bakhtin argued that in our social interactions we would start 
from the accumulated language material, which is inevitably ideo-
logically loaded—we then proceed with our dialogue in certain so-
cial circumstances, using speech genres and specific utterances.34 
His observations certainly resonate in the digital world of social me-
dia where individuals communicate through posting and reposting 
of words, images, and videos each chosen with its semiotic freight 
and particular connotations understood within that community. An-
nemarie Bridy notes that: 
For Bakhtin, intertextuality is an intrinsic property of 
language because the words a writer chooses “are al-
ready populated with the social intentions of others.” 
The writer “compels them to serve his own new in-
tentions, to serve a second master.”35 
Stuart Hall has defined the taking of an existing meaning and 
reappropriating it for new meanings as “trans-coding”36 and 
 
31 JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 239 (1st ed. 1987). Fiske examines the construction 
of meanings by the audience, which plays with parodies and actively subverts the dominant 
encoding of the sign. See also Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 489, 489–90 (2006). 
32 See generally MIKHAIL M. BAKHTIN, SPEECH GENRES AND OTHER LATE ESSAYS (Vern 
W. McGee, trans., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., 1994); MICHAEL E. GARDINER, 
THE DIALOGICS OF CRITIQUE: M.M. BAKHTIN AND THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1992). 
33 BAKHTIN, supra note 32, at 76–77; GARDINER, supra note 32, at 7. 
34 LESZEK KOCZANOWICZ, POLITICS OF DIALOGUE: NON-CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY AND 
CRITICAL COMMUNITY 77 (2015). 
35 Annemarie Bridy, Fearless Girl Meets Charging Bull: Copyright and the Regulation 
of Intertextuality, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 293, 302 (2019) (internal citations omitted). 
36 Stuart Hall, The Spectacle of the “Other”, in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL 
REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 223, 270 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997). The term 
“transfunctionalize” has also been used to describe how subcultures assign new and often 
contradictory meanings to signs as understood by mainstream society. PAUL NATHANSON, 
OVER THE RAINBOW: THE WIZARD OF OZ AS A SECULAR MYTH OF AMERICA 343 (1991). 
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explained that repressed groups may use trans-coding strategies to 
reverse stereotypes, substitute negative portrayals with positive 
ones, or contest subordinate representations from within.37 Such a 
description possibly falls within Hal Foster’s description of the 
countercultural movement which seeks to counter the myth; such 
“‘myth-robbery’ seeks to restore the original sign for its social con-
text or to break apart the abstracted mythical sign and to reinscribe 
it in a countermythical system.”38 However, Foster views the “sub-
cultural” practice to be different from the countercultural in that it 
“recodes signs rather than poses a revolutionary practice of its 
own.”39 Despite the differences, both countercultural and subcul-
tural recodings are arguably applicable to the transformative use 
doctrine in copyright law. 
In his study of digital fandom, Paul Booth advances his thesis of 
a “philosophy of playfulness” which he observes to be prevalent in 
the individual’s use of today’s digital technology.40 Drawing on 
Bakhtin’s writings, Booth postulates that on the internet, individuals 
entering into a “carnivalesque atmosphere subsume their identities, 
join a collectivity, and participate in a textual freedom.”41 Bakhtin’s 
earlier interest in a purely textual form of dialogism (such as in his 
1929 study of Fyodor Dostoevsky) soon evolved into a preoccupa-
tion with the transgressive potential of a constellation of cultural 
practices, rituals, and symbols designated as the “carnivalesque” 
that is concerned with “images of symbolic degradation and the 
‘bringing down to earth’ of hegemonic values, ideas, and sentiments 
via the evocation of utopian community.”42 He initially developed 
the concept of carnival while analyzing François Rabelais’s writings 
and their connection to the popular laughing culture of the Renais-
sance. Bakhtin was exiled from the center of official Soviet culture 
due to his involvement in an unofficial circle of philosophers, and 
he was interested in writing about “the multiplicity of split-offs from 
 
37 Hall, supra note 36, at 270–75. 
38 HAL FOSTER, RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL POLITICS 169 (1985). 
39 Id. at 170. 
40 PAUL BOOTH, DIGITAL FANDOM: NEW MEDIA STUDIES 2 (1st prtg. 2010). 
41 Id. at 60. See also PAUL BOOTH, PLAYING FANS: NEGOTIATING FANDOM AND MEDIA IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 136–149 (2015). 
42 Michael Gardiner, Bakhtin’s Carnival: Utopia as Critique, 3 UTOPIAN STUD., no. 2, 
21, 28 (1992). 
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the core” and “the conflict between the two forces, the centrifugal 
and the centripetal” within the Soviet cultural system.43 According 
to Bakhtin, the lively carnival ethos represented by folklore and folk 
laughter stood in opposition to the official and serious church-sanc-
tioned and feudal culture.44 This resulted in the carnival’s appear-
ance as a direct response to medieval political theology.45 Bakhtin’s 
notion of the carnival has been applied to studies of the hegemony 
of the Roman Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire of the Re-
naissance, and Stalinism.46 Today, a parallel may be drawn with the 
carnivalesque atmosphere on social media in contradistinction to the 
more serious real world where intellectual property rights are more 
rigorously and rigidly enforced. Renate Lachmann explains that the 
ensemble of rites and symbols is subjugated to: 
[t]he principle of laughter that organizes the carnival 
is transtemporal and universal. Laughter rises above 
and transcends the objects at which it is temporarily 
aimed: official institutions and the sacral.47 
It had been noted similarly that the carnival culture’s idea of 
“transgression of cultural norms and values by subaltern groups, [is] 
the ideal critical tool for approaching all kinds of social and material 
interactions.”48 In her reading of Bakhtin, Elizabeth Rosenblatt has 
observed that the medieval carnival has brought together a mélange 
of clerics, schoolmen, and ordinary people “to engage in renewal 
and recreation, providing temporary release from a rigid ideological 
system”, thus creating “a temporary space for fantasy, radicalism, 
and criticism of the upper strata.” 49 Indeed, Bakhtin’s conceptual-
ization of the carnival is very much focused on how a temporary 
upending of hierarchy is tolerated within a prescribed time and space 
that is still very much governed by rules. In the carnival, strict social 
and class roles are reversed or inverted through ritual spectacles and 
 
43 Lachmann, supra note 7, at 116. 
44     Id. at 118. 
45 See id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 123. 
48 Chris Humphrey, Bakhtin and the Study of Popular Culture: Re-thinking Carnival as 
a Historical and Analytical Concept, in MATERIALIZING BAKHTIN 164, 165 (Craig Brandist 
& Galin Tihanov eds., 2000). 
49 Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 386. 
2021] COPYRIGHT FAIR USE AND THE DIGITAL CARNIVALESQUE 875 
 
discourse that include profanities, parodies, pastiche, and mock-
ery.50 The transgressive activities cloaked in a festive spirit allowed 
the ordinary folk to talk back to the dominant culture and the power 
czars, but it did not undermine or distort the broader framework of 
class and political structure.51 Framing copyright law through this 
lens, Rosenblatt argues: 
[l]ike the carnivalesque, fair uses employ the com-
municative tools of the establishment to convey a 
new, possibly contradictory meaning—a secular use 
of sacred symbols, so to speak. The carnivalesque en-
gages in dialogue by assigning a folk meaning to (re-
ligious or other authoritarian) signs, resisting a 
power structure that would assign a monologic 
meaning to those same signs.52 
More specifically, David Tan, co-author of this Article, has pre-
viously mooted a more nuanced approach to the new media para-
digm that posits cultural practices of fans as a form of “transforma-
tive play” within an interactive social and cultural space which of-
fers exciting collaborative possibilities to authors and fans,53 ap-
proaching fair use through the viewpoint of the carnivalesque.54 It 
has also been suggested that the law be more accepting of the antics 
of the “prankster” in culture jamming where resistance is effected 
“less through negating and opposing dominant rhetorics than by 
playfully and provocatively folding existing cultural forms in on 
themselves.”55 The authors agree with Rosenblatt that framing fair 
use through a carnivalesque lens acknowledges “intertextual and re-
lational nature of expression, but at the same time, the framework of 
 
50 Mohammed & Trumpbour, supra note 10, at 3. 
51 Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 386. 
52 Id. at 388. 
53 David Tan, Fair Use and Transformative Play in the Digital Age, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT 102, 130 (Megan 
Richardson ed., 2017). 
54 David Tan, De(Re)Constructing Narratives in Intellectual Property Law: 
Transformative Play, Culture Jamming, and Poststructural Disruptions, 32 L. & 
LITERATURE 75, 87 (2020). 
55 Christine Harold, Pranking Rhetoric: “Culture Jamming” as Media Activism, 21 
CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMMC’N. 189, 191 (2004). 
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fair use is not a free-for-all.”56 However, Rosenblatt does not eluci-
date how conduct functioning as carnivalesque can be protected by 
current fair use doctrine. Indeed, the four factors of fair use have to 
carefully be weighed taking into account the public benefit of ex-
cusing/permitting the transgressive (infringing) behavior. The au-
thors propose to build on Rosenblatt’s conception of the carni-
valesque by considering how the creation and maintenance of the 
online public persona in a social media environment can benefit 
from the notion of a “digital carnivalesque.” 
Three key characteristics of the carnivalesque are pertinent here. 
First, the laughing culture of the carnival where official authority is 
subverted by laughter and all carnival participants are friendly with 
each other regardless of their social standing.57 Jesters are permitted 
to speak their minds and real names are replaced by nicknames. Sec-
ond, the material culture of pleasure and gluttony predominates in 
the carnival as the participants obsess with sex, body parts, material 
objects, and food.58 Third, the game culture presents a giddy psy-
chedelia of repeated activities and rituals with rewards and prizes, 
including the election of the mock king.59 One can immediately see 
how a social media platform like Instagram embodies all three at-
tributes. Individuals create an online persona using nicknames and 
engage in familiar and intimate interactions with one another. The 
most popular postings revolve around obsessions with celebrity, sex, 
material objects, and food. Influencers are financially rewarded for 
specific activities, as well as other participants for taking part in con-
tests.60 In the Bakhtinian program of an ideal social life, the 
 
56 Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 390. 
57 Gaufman, supra note 10, at 413 (internal citations omitted). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 414. 
60 See, e.g., Gil Appel, Lauren Grewal, Rhonda Hadi, & Andrew T. Stephen, The Future 
of Social Media in Marketing, 48 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 79 (2020); Paul Jankowski, Gaming 
Is The Best Social Media Platform For Brands To Reach Gen-Z, FORBES (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauljankowski/2020/06/01/gaming-is-the-best-social-
media-platform-for-brands-to-reach-gen-z/ [https://perma.cc/3P8S-D3ER]; Paul Suciu, 
Social Media Influencers—Still Worth the Money, FORBES (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2020/05/29/social-media-influencers—still-
worth-the-money/ [https://perma.cc/7Y7J-ZVPL]; Audrey Conklin, How Much Money Do 
Social Media Influencers Make?, FOX BUSINESS (Mar. 11, 2020), 
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perpetual fluctuation of the traditional carnival discourse from pa-
thos to grotesque, or from laughter to seriousness, precludes the ap-
propriation of the empty space of the carnival feast by any perma-
nent symbol.61 Importantly, the digital carnivalesque cannot be an 
embodied utopia as intellectual property rules will continue to oper-
ate in this online milieu, but we can regard this carnival with its on-
going utterances and dialogue as a universal phenomenon reflecting 
human nature with immense potential for freedom of expression that 
ought to be safeguarded. 
The US Supreme Court in both Golan v Holder and Eldred v 
Ashcroft held that “the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright protection, 
i.e., the ‘idea/expression dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense . . . 
are recognized in our jurisprudence as ‘built-in First Amendment 
accommodations.’”62 In particular, the fair use defense as codified 
in 17 USC §107 “allows the public to use not only facts and ideas 
contained in a copyrighted work, but also [the author’s] expression 
itself in certain circumstances.”63 It is unsurprising that in the con-
text of a robust free speech culture emboldened by the First Amend-
ment, U.S. courts have interpreted the notion of transformative use 
liberally—and consequentially the fair use defense—when the free-
dom of speech would be unduly constrained by the enforcement of 
the rights of copyright owners. One of the most significant contri-
butions that semiotics can bring to copyright law is in the analysis 
of fair use. In copyright fair use, the pertinent inquiry is whether the 
secondary work “adds something new, with a further purpose or  
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,  
or message.”64 
As Tan has pointed out,65 Brian Holland finds that certain as-
pects of the critical theories aligned with the law and literature 




61 KOCZANOWICZ, supra note 34, at 84–85. 
62 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012); Eldred v. Aschroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 
(2003). 
63 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. 
64 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
65 Tan, supra note 54. 
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fair use that addresses both monopoly incentive and accommodation 
concerns. He explains: 
First, these critical theories shift the focus away from 
works of authorship and toward audience engage-
ment with the text. This mitigates the tendency to 
overvalue, through a monopoly interest, those who 
most closely fit the image of the romantic author and 
to undervalue both prior works and the audience. 
Second, these critical theories acknowledge that an 
author does not control the meaning of a work. In-
stead, meaning is determined, at least in part, through 
intertextual processes. This opens the door to a re-
consideration of meaning-making and the role of au-
diences in that process, with significant implications 
for copyright doctrine.66 
Holland postulates that “the prevailing conception of transform-
ativeness [in copyright fair use] is one of romantic authorship, evi-
denced by a defendant’s authorial purpose or activity” and proposes 
an approach “grounded in social semiotic theory [that] attempts to 
account for the multiple and divergent meanings created as various 
interpretive communities engage a particular work.”67 However, 
contrary to Holland’s observations that the U.S. courts currently fo-
cus on the degree to which a defendant has engaged in authorial ac-
tivity in the fair use analysis,68 the current approach of the Second 
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals appears to be able to accom-
modate the shifting of the transformativeness inquiry from locating 
an authorial presence or authorial activity, to one of reader interpre-
tation, i.e. whether one might reasonably perceive the creation of 
“new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings.”69 As Laura Heymann points out, ultimately, the question is 
whether the resulting work “is transformative in its meaning—that 
 
66 H. Brian Holland, Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 
335, 358 (2011). 
67 Id. at 348. 
68 Id. at 354–56. 
69 See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 
244 (2d Cir. 2006); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, LLC, 983 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 
2020); Seltzer v. Green Day, 729 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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is, whether the reader perceives the second copy as signifying some-
thing different from the first.”70 When one analyzes a work of cop-
yright, one can potentially read it semiotically as embodying a unity 
of modern cultural meanings capable of being opposed or resisted 
(through “countercultural” means such as parody), or one can regard 
it as possessing polysemous qualities which may be contested or dis-
rupted (through “subcultural” practice such as bricolage or pas-
tiche). Uses that comment on or present a different way of viewing 
familiar iconography, societal archetypes, public obsessions, and 
majoritarian beliefs—typical carnivalesque conduct—all fall within 
the First Amendment categories of protected speech, such as politi-
cal speech, art, entertainment, and matters of public interest.71 Par-
ody may be viewed as contributing valuable commentary and criti-
cism to the marketplace of ideas, or advancing democratic debate on 
matters of public interest through the use of irreverent humor.72 Var-
ious forms of appropriation art, which can include memes on social 
media and altered image posts on Instagram, can be viewed as ide-
ological critiques that take or hijack dominant words and images to 
create insubordinate, counter messages.73 Furthermore, the partici-
patory theory of the First Amendment supports the protection of the 
making of “representations about self, identity, community, solidar-
ity, and difference” or the articulation of political and social aspira-
tions using these copyright signs within a “dialogic democracy.”74 
Within this carnivalesque, it may be argued that fair use clearly ad-
vances the marketplace of ideas and the democratic rationale 
 
70 Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 
31 COLUM. J. LAW & THE ARTS 445, 455 (2008). However, this observation is not 
unproblematic. Holland notes that:  
Courts have come to assume, however, that those messages and meanings 
reside in the mind and intentions of the “author,” that those messages and 
meanings are transmitted from the author to the audience, and that certain 
segments of the audience either “get it” or do not. But this paradigm 
misconceives the process by which “meaning” is realized. Meaning is not 
controlled, transmitted, or even consistent. It is, instead, negotiated and 
actualized in engagement with the audience, or, more appropriately, audiences. 
Holland, supra note 66, at 361. See also Laura A. Heymann, Reasonable Appropriation 
and Reader Response, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 343 (2019). 
71 Tan, supra note 15, at 344. 
72 Id. at 345. 
73 Id. at 348. 
74 Id. at 378–79. 
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through the creation of “new information” and “new insights and 
understandings,” as well as the self-fulfillment function through the 
creation of “new aesthetics.”75 
B. Fair Use in the 21st Century 
Justice Story’s test in Folsom v. Marsh is widely considered to 
be the origin of fair use in the U.S..76 Section 107 of the Copyright 
Act 1976 permits use of copyrighted works “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or re-
search,” with consideration of a non-exhaustive list of four factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted works.77 
These factors will be examined in turn below. 
1. Purpose and Character of the Use 
Pierre Leval, then a Judge of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, published an influential article 
in 1990 that considered “whether imprecision—the absence of a 
clear standard—in the fair use doctrine [was] a strength or a weak-
ness.”78 Leval noted that “throughout the development of the fair 
use doctrine, courts had failed to fashion a set of governing princi-
ples or values”79 but he was concerned that fair use “should be per-
ceived not as a disorderly basket of exceptions to the rules of copy-
right, nor as a departure from the principles governing that body of 
law, but rather as a rational, integral part of copyright.”80 Leval ad-
vocated instilling a coherent and useful set of principles in the fair 
 
75 Id. at 358. 
76 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
77 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
78 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
79 Id. at 1105. 
80 Id. at 1107. 
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use doctrine, such that “the use must be of a character that serves the 
copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public in-
struction without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativ-
ity.”81 In his analysis of the four statutory fair use factors, Leval was 
of the view that factor one—the “purpose and character of the 
use”—is the “soul of fair use.”82 Explaining that this consideration 
raises the question of whether the secondary use “fulfil[s] the objec-
tive of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public illumina-
tion,”83 he emphasized that the answer turns primarily on whether, 
and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative. Leval 
frames the inquiry as follows: 
The use must be productive and must employ the 
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different 
purpose from the original . . . [If] the secondary use 
adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is 
used as raw material, transformed in the creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings—this is the very type of activity that 
the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrich-
ment of society.84 
Leval also provided some examples of transformative use which 
included criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of  
the original author, summarizing an idea argued in the original  
in order to defend or rebut it, parody, symbolism, and aesthetic  
declarations.85 
The phrase “transformative use” has catapulted into prominence 
in fair use jurisprudence ever since the Supreme Court in 1994 em-
braced transformativeness as the heart of fair use in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music Inc.86 The decision is important in its emphasis on 
 
81 Id. at 1110. 
82 Id. at 1116. 
83 Id. at 1111. 
84 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
85 Id. 
86 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The controversial rap 
group 2 Live Crew sampled the distinctive bassline from Roy Orbison’s original hit song 
Pretty Woman, used the same title in their parody song, and the romantic lyrics were 
replaced with lyrics about a big hairy woman and her exploits. 
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how a highly transformative use of an original work may qualify the 
secondary infringing work for fair use protection even if the latter 
was commercial in nature, rebutting earlier presumptions in cases 
like Harper & Row Publishers v Nation Enterprises87 and Sony 
Corp of America v Universal City Studios.88 While all four statutory 
fair use factors are supposed to be weighed together to determine 
whether a use is fair, the first factor has largely dominated the anal-
ysis in the last three decades since the Supreme Court in Campbell 
endorsed transformative use doctrine (a concept which to which  
section 107 does not even explicitly refer).89 In his empirical  
study of U.S. copyright decisions up to January 1, 2017, Jiarui Liu  
concluded: 
A finding of transformative use overrides findings of 
commercial purpose and bad faith under factor one, 
makes irrelevant the issue of whether the original 
work is creative or unpublished under factor two, 
stretches the extent of copying permitted under factor 
three towards 100% verbatim reproduction, and pre-
cludes the evidence on damage to the primary or de-
rivative market under factor four even though there 
exists a well-functioning market for the use.90 
The Supreme Court in Campbell held that a work will be trans-
formative to the extent the new work “adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new ex-
pression, meaning, or message.”91 The extent to which a use is trans-
formative can reduce the weight given to other factors such as com-
merciality,92 because highly transformative secondary uses do not 
 
87 Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
88 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
89 See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of US Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978–2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 549 (2008); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 47 (2012); Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright 
Law, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163 (2019). 
90 Liu, supra note 89, at 240. 
91 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
92 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. However, Judge Leval noted recently in Capitol Records, 
LLC v ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 661 (2d Cir. 2018):  
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provide a market substitute for the original work. The decision ap-
peared to have deemphasized the importance of the fourth factor in 
the evaluation of fair use, and most of the lower courts’ decisions in 
the aftermath of Campbell seemed to proceed on the basis that “if 
transformative, then fair use.”93 In almost thirty years since Leval 
urged courts to adopt transformation as a guiding principle of fair 
use and following its endorsement in Campbell, the transformative 
use doctrine has undergone a remarkable judicial expansion to in-
clude virtually any “creation of new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings.”94 
While parody appeared to occupy an exalted position in the an-
nals of fair use after Campbell, it becomes clearer from the mid-
2000s onwards in a series of Circuit Court decisions that courts 
should not be fixated with unnaturally distinguishing parody from 
satire, or locating a critical commentary on the original work, when 
assessing the first factor of fair use.95 The complexity of defining 
parody has been highlighted in many scholarly writings.96 In her 
masterful analysis of the history of the parody genre, Sabine Jacques 
observes that “parody is often used interchangeably with terms such 
as pastiche, caricature, satire, irony, imitation, plagiarism, and bur-
lesque.”97 In particular, parodies and satires are not hermetically 
 
[W]hile the mere fact of a commercial motivation rarely pushes the first factor 
determination against fair use (as so many canonical fair uses, such as book 
reviews; quotation of prominent figures in news reports, news commentary, 
and history books; the performance of parodic plays, are all commercial), in 
some circumstances a commercial motive will weigh against a finding of fair 
use under Factor One. 
(Citation omitted). 
93 Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use in the United States: Transformed, Deformed, Reformed?, 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 277 (2020). Ginsburg questions whether the pendulum of 
transformative use has begun to return to a more balanced fair use analysis but cautions 
that renewed emphasis on the fourth factor risks simply inverting the test (“The formula ‘if 
transformative work/purpose, then no market harm’ meets its corollary: ‘If commercial and 
not transformative, then market harm.’ Thus, fair use continues to reduce to a one-factor 
test, but one that cuts both ways.”). Id. at 287. 
94 See Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp, Inc. 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Leval, supra note 78, at 1111).  
95 See, e.g., Amy Lai, Copyright Law and Its Parody Defense: Multiple Legal 
Perspectives, 4 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 311 (2015).  
96 See, e.g., SABINE JACQUES, THE PARODY EXCEPTION IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1–36 (2019). 
97 Id. at 7. 
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separated from one another, and they can blend in a single work 
called a “satiric parody.” Referring to Mattel v. MCA Records,98 
Jacques points out that the song Barbie Girl by the Danish band 
Aqua “parodies the famous fashion doll manufactured by Mattel, but 
at the same time, it is a satiric commentary on the ‘blond bimbo’ 
image of women in today’s society.”99 Simon Dentith contends that 
it is impossible to encapsulate parody in a single definition, and sug-
gests that it broadly “includes any cultural practice which provides 
a relatively polemical allusive imitation of another cultural produc-
tion or practice.”100 
In 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Blanch v. Koons 
held that appropriation artist Jeff Koons’ use of Andrea Blanch’s 
fashion photograph was fair use even though he did not comment on 
the original work, rather using it “as fodder for his commentary on 
the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media.”101 The Sec-
ond Circuit expressly disagreed that comment or criticism of the 
original work is required to show transformative use, and instead 
inquired whether the original work was used in the “creation of new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”102 In 
2013, the Second Circuit reiterated in Cariou v. Prince that a work 
need not comment on the original to be transformative, and went 
even further to state that transformativeness will be judged on how 
the work may “reasonably be perceived” by the audience, rather 
than relying on an artist’s stated intent. 103 Whether a secondary use 
is parody or satire is of greater importance in jurisdictions with 
closed-ended fair dealing provisions such as those in the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia than under present U.S. fair use 
doctrine. Since 2006, the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
 
98 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
99 JACQUES, supra note 96, at 8. 
100 SIMON DENTITH, PARODY 9 (2000). 
101 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006). 
102 Id. at 253. See also Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp, Inc. 150 F.3d 132, 141 
(2d Cir. 1998) (“If ‘the secondary use adds value to the original—if [copyrightable 
expression in the original work] is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of 
activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
103 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Appeals in a consistent lineage of decisions such as Blanch v. 
Koons,104 Cariou v. Prince,105 Seltzer v. Green Day,106 TCA Televi-
sion Corp. v. McCollum,107 and Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Com-
icMix108 have avoided discussing specifically whether an infringing 
use was parody or satire, instead applying the “creation of new in-
formation, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” test for 
transformativeness. Even so, a parodic or satirical purpose may per-
mit greater copying under the third factor analysis,109 and reduce the 
relevant market harm under the fourth factor.110 Largely in line with 
Pamela Samuelson’s policy clusters,111 Tan has conducted a review 
of US fair use cases post-Campbell, identifying five broad and 
sometimes overlapping categories of transformative uses identified 
as demonstrating a change in the “purpose” or “character” under 17 
U.S.C § 107: 
(1) Directly commenting on or criticizing the original 
work, or targeting the original work for ridicule or 
parody; 
(2) Using the original work to comment on some-
thing else or in a satire, but the secondary work none-
theless contains some underlying critical relevance 
to the original work; 
(3) Recontextualizing the original work without sig-
nificant modification but changing the meaning of 
the original work (e.g., Andy Warhol’s appropriation 
art); 
 
104 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
105 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
106 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
107 TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168 (2d Cir 2016). 
108  Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, 983 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2020). The 
infringing work Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go! which was a mash-up of characters from 
Star Trek and Seussian landscapes, was separately considered by the court on whether it 
was a parody and in the alternative, whether it had the “benchmarks of transformative use.” 
Id. at 451–61. 
109 See e.g., TCA, 839 F.3d 168 (ruling that a non-parodic and non-satirical verbatim use 
of a famous comedy routine Who’s on First? in a play was not fair use since it had the same 
purpose as the original). 
110 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“[T]here is no 
protectable derivative market for criticism.”). 
111 See generally Pamela Samuelson, supra note 22. 
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(4) Changing the purpose of the original work within 
an expressive context (e.g., from entertainment to ed-
ucation or research); and 
(5) Changing the purpose of the original work within 
a technological context and with significant social 
benefit. 112 
More recently, in a spate of fair use decisions involving technol-
ogy as opposed to the visual and performing arts contexts, the Cir-
cuit Courts have focused more closely on the statutory text of 
whether there was a change in “purpose” or “character” when deter-
mining fair use.113 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in TCA Tel-
evision Corp. v. McCollum has commented that the generous view 
of what might constitute transformative use (and therefore fair use) 
might have hit its “high-water mark” in Cariou.114 Judge Pierre 
Leval, now sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, also re-
treated noticeably from endorsing the transformative use talisman in 
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., commenting that the fourth 
factor is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use.”115 Ginsburg notes that during this period of the first factor pri-
macy, while courts have followed a nearly formulaic “if 
 
112 Tan, supra note 15, at 332–34. See also Liu, supra note 89, at 204–10. 
113 See, e.g., Authors Guild Inc., et al. v. Google, Inc. 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(allowing researchers access to snippets in Google Books program, which scanned entire 
contents of books but allowed only minimal access to the text of those books, was fair use); 
Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018) [hereinafter 
“TVEyes”] (allowing subscribers to search and view substantial portions of copyrighted 
news broadcasts is not fair use); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2d 
Cir. 2018) (ruling that resale of digital music files is not fair use); Oracle Am., Inc. v. 
Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding the purpose of the API packages in 
Android is the same as the purpose of the packages in the Java platform and that Google 
made no alteration to the expressive content or message of the copyrighted material); 
Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding that posting 
a cropped photograph, without a change in purpose, is not fair use); VHT, Inc. v. Zillow 
Grp., Inc., 918 F. 3d 723 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that searchable full-sized real estate 
images displayed for the same purpose as the original photographs is not fair use). 
114 TCA TV Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d at 181. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals was also highly critical of the Cariou decision: Kienitz v. Sconnie 
Nation, LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, 
because asking exclusively whether something is ‘transformative’ not only replaces the list 
in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects derivative works.”). 
115 910 F.3d at 662 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 566 (1985)). 
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transformative, then fair use,”116 one should be cautious against flip-
ping this single-factor analysis to “[i]f commercial and not trans-
formative, then market harm.”117 The resurgence of the primacy of 
the fourth factor in last few years will be discussed below. 
Rosenblatt’s excellent analysis will not be repeated here. The 
authors agree that the “carnival of fair use is extraordinarily diverse 
and can include, for example, criticism, parody, satire, data-mining, 
fanworks, collage, and scholarship.”118 Viewing cases like Camp-
bell and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.119 through a Bakh-
tinian lens, Bridy locates the presence of a “confrontational dialo-
gism” and finds that the theme of “intertextual inversion” runs 
through these cases.120 The commonality in cases like Campbell, 
Blanch, Cariou, and Authors Guild is that they involve defendants 
using the works of the owners with a purpose or character different 
from what the owners intended. 
2. Nature of the Work 
This factor is virtually never dispositive in a fair use analysis but 
copying from factual/compilation works is more likely to be found 
fair use—whereas taking from creative, artistic, and fictional works 
will be less so.121 This is in line with copyright’s protection of 
 
116 Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 277. 
117 Id. at 287. 
118 Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 389. 
119 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
120 Bridy, supra note 35, at 319–20. Bridy also comments: “By specifically identifying 
criticism and commentary as examples of protected second-degree uses, the Copyright Act 
discourages the use of copyright to enforce authorial monologism in cases involving 
unfaithful continuations and other disputatious hypertexts.” Id. at 321. 
121 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1993) (“This factor calls for 
recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than 
others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former 
works are copied.”); Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir. 
2019) (“As a basic matter, photographs are ‘generally viewed as creative, aesthetic 
expressions of a scene or image’ and have long received thick copyright protection. This 
is so even though photographs capture images of reality. ‘Simply because a photo 
documents an event does not turn a pictorial representation into a factual recitation . . .  
Photos that we now regard as iconic often document an event—whether the flight of the 
Wright Brothers’ airplane, the sailor’s kiss in Times Square on V-J Day, the first landing 
on the moon, or the fall of the Berlin Wall.’”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Monge 
v. Maya Mags., Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
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expression, rather than facts or ideas. The Supreme Court in Camp-
bell held that the second factor “calls for recognition that some 
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than 
others,”122 noting that parodies “almost invariably copy publicly 
known, expressive works.”123 Additionally, use of unpublished 
works narrows the scope of fair use.124 Memes often make use of 
widely known photographs and audiovisual works, which belong to 
the “core” of copyright protection, but this factor is unlikely to be 
significant in the fair use analysis. 
3. Amount and Substantiality Taken 
The amount and substantiality taken from the original work is 
an important consideration in the fair use analysis. This third factor 
was prominently considered in cases such as Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprise and more recently in TCA v. 
McCollum. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court held the defend-
ant’s taking of some 300 words from President Ford’s memoir was 
not fair use.125 Though representing a small number of words in re-
lation to the whole, the Supreme Court held that those amounted to 
“the heart of the book,” which militated against finding fair use.126 
The Supreme Court held in Campbell that substantial taking from 
the original may “reveal a dearth of transformative character or pur-
pose under the first factor, or a greater likelihood of market harm 
under the fourth.”127 
Secondary use of the entire or significant portions of copy-
righted works as the “raw material” for social commentary without 
direct bearing on or criticism of the original will have to overcome 
or counterbalance this factor, which would generally weigh against 
a finding of fair use. This discomfort that courts may have in allow-
ing too much leeway to non-parodic works was evident in how the 
Second Circuit could not decide as a matter of law that five of 
 
122 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
123 Id. 
124 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citation 
omitted); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709–10 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 
125 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985). 
126 Id. at 564–65. 
127 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. 
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Richard Prince’s works, which reproduced the entire photographs 
by Patrick Cariou with minimal alterations, were fair use as it was 
unclear whether the alterations amounted to a sufficient transfor-
mation of the original work of art such that the new work was trans-
formative.128 Courts will also consider the broader public good pro-
vided by the new use and some uses that necessitate taking of the 
whole work may nonetheless qualify as fair use as there was clearly 
a new purpose.129 Under this factor, a parodic purpose or one which 
directly criticizes or comments on the original work may justify re-
productions of entire or significant portions of copyrighted works.130 
4. Effect on Market and Potential Market for the Work 
The Supreme Court held in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 
that the fourth factor is “perhaps the most important” of the fair use 
analysis.131 Courts today consider the extent to which new work su-
persedes the original, the effects on the licensing market, and the 
impairment on the copyright owner’s exclusive right to authorize 
derivative works.132 Fromer points out that before Campbell, the Su-
preme Court’s treatment of market effects tended to be “tentative 
 
128 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710–11. 
129 See e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2015). See also 
Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 610–12 (2d Cir. 
2006) (finding a “transformative purpose” in the complete reproduction of seven 
copyrighted images). 
130 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (“For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the 
definitions, and the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use 
of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, 
comments on that author’s works.”). However, the Supreme Court also said,  
The fact that parody can claim legitimacy for some appropriation does not, of 
course, tell either parodist or judge much about where to draw the line. Like a 
book review quoting the copyrighted material criticized, parody may or may 
not be fair use, and petitioners’ suggestion that any parodic use is 
presumptively fair has no more justification in law or fact than the equally 
hopeful claim that any use for news reporting should be presumed fair. 
Id. at 581. 
131 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476 (1984). 
132 See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708–09; Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223–25; Fox News 
Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 181; Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 
910 F.3d 649, 662–63; Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, LLC, 983 F.3d 443, 458–61 
(9th Cir. 2020). 
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and embryonic.”133 In the span of a year, the Supreme Court decided 
Sony and Harper & Row. In Sony, the court considered the potential 
market for pre-recorded videotapes too speculative and the non-
commercial nature of time-shifting enabled by home videotape re-
cording.134 The court in Harper & Row considered the direct evi-
dence of market harm resulting from the “scooping” of key excerpts 
of President Ford’s memoir by The Nation newspaper in its finding 
against fair use.135 
Citing Sony, Harper & Row, and Folsom v. Marsh, the Supreme 
Court in Campbell held that the fourth factor “requires courts to con-
sider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular 
actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and 
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . 
would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential mar-
ket’ for the original.”136 However, Justice Souter’s emphatic pro-
nouncement in Campbell has had the (perhaps unintended) effect of 
amplifying the ascendancy of the first over the fourth factor: “[T]he 
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance 
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a find-
ing of fair use.”137 
Fromer notes that transformative works including parodies are 
“unlikely to cause relevant market harm to a copyright owner, even 
if they can harm the market for the copyrighted work in unrelated 
ways.”138 Moreover, since works that transform existing material are 
directly connected to those works, they “can draw attention to, en-
hance, or affirm the work’s role in the marketplace.”139 Ginsburg 
rightly observes that decisions following Campbell often concluded 
that “if the use was ‘transformative’, then the market within which 
it operated was also ‘transformative’, and, accordingly, non-
 
133 Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use. 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 625 
(2015). 
134 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454, 484–85. 
135 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 602–03. 
136 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (internal citations 
omitted). 
137 Id. at 579. 
138 Fromer, supra note 134, at 629. 
139 Id. at 630. 
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competing.”140 However, recent decisions from the Second and 
Ninth Circuit Courts seem to mark a renaissance of the fourth fac-
tor.141 Ginsburg argues that this renewed emphasis on the fourth fac-
tor could risk simply reversing the formula that transformative 
works do not impact the market of the original.142 
Judge Pierre Leval, who authored the iconic article that resulted 
in the Supreme Court articulating the transformative use doctrine, 
was sitting as a judge for the Second Circuit in Capitol Records, 
LLC v. ReDigi Inc. when he reiterated the Supreme Court’s descrip-
tion of the fourth factor in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises as “undoubtedly the single most important element of 
fair use.”143 Citing Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, LLC and 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., he correctly observed that the fourth 
factor is a consideration of whether the secondary use brings a com-
peting substitute to the marketplace, and “the more the objective of 
the secondary use differs from the original, the less likely it will be 
to supplant the commercial market for the original.”144 Judge Leval 
held that ReDigi’s minimally transformative purpose fell short of 
TVEyes’ failed assertion of fair use, and competed in an identical 
market as the original works.145 These recent decisions suggest that 
the influential Second Circuit has begun to reemphasize the fourth 
factor over the hitherto dominance of the first factor in a fair use 
analysis. The Seventh Circuit has already eschewed the application 
of the transformative use doctrine and has asserted the importance 
of the fourth factor.146 
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit in VHT v. Zillow held that Zillow’s 
reproduction of VHT’s high-definition photographs was a non-
 
140 Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 268. 
141 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 662–63 (2d Cir. 2018); Dr. Seuss 
Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, LLP, 983 F.3d 443, 458–61 (9th Cir. 2020). 
142 Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 287 (“In other words, ‘transformativeness’ may remain 
decisive, but the equation has flipped. The formula ‘if transformative work/purpose, then 
no market harm’ meets its corollary: ‘if commercial and not transformative, then market 
harm.’ Thus, fair use continues to reduce to a one-factor test, but one that cuts both ways.”) 
143 Capitol Records, 910 F.3d at 662 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)). 
144 Id. 910 F.3d at 662 (internal citations omitted). 
145 Id. at 663. 
146 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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transformative use that usurped the original market for the photo-
graphs, noting that “the label ‘search engine’ is not a talismanic term 
that serves as an on-off switch as to fair use.”147 In the same year, 
the Fourth Circuit also held in Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods that 
the commercial and non-transformative reproduction of Brammer’s 
photo impacted its licensing market and was therefore not fair 
use.148 In 2020, the Ninth Circuit found that ComicMix created, 
without seeking permission or a license, a non-transformative com-
mercial mash-up work that targets and usurps the potential market 
for Dr. Seuss’s classic book, Oh, the Places You’ll Go!.149 It was 
pertinent that Seuss often “collaborates with other creators, includ-
ing in projects that mix different stories and characters  . . . [and that] 
Seuss routinely receives requests for collaborations and licenses, 
and has entered into various collaborations that apply Seuss’s works 
to new creative contexts.”150 Ginsburg argues that rather than a sim-
ple rebalancing in favor of the fourth factor which risks introducing 
other distortions to the analysis, courts should examine “the amount 
of the copying (factor 3) in light of how the allegedly transformative 
work treats the copied material (factor 1) [which] should help deter-
mine the substitution effect (factor 4) of the portion taken.”151 If the 
trend towards a renewed emphasis on the fourth factor continues, 
one might expect courts to place greater weight on the substitution 
effects or effects on potential derivative and licensing markets that 
a secondary use impinges on. Transformative use will continue to 
be an important consideration that alters the effects of a secondary 
use on the potential market for a work, but uses that copy to “avoid 
the drudgery in working up something fresh” or “merely . . . to get 
attention”152 are unlikely to succeed in their claim, especially when 
what the new use delivers is substantially similar to the original ex-
pression. Moving forward, transformative use as a juridical concept 
is also unlikely to have the trump effect which it has enjoyed for 
over the last three decades. 
 
147 VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 723, 742 (9th Cir. 2019). 
148 Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC., 922 F.3d 255, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2019). 
149    Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix, LLC, 983 F.3d 443, 461 (9th Cir. 2020). 
150    Id. at 460. 
151 Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 293. 
152 Campbell v. Rose-Acuff Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
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II. INTERNET MEMES AND DIGITAL CULTURE 
Memes usually alter the meaning of the underlying works 
through semiotic recontextualization, recoding, or visual editing, but 
they often do so in a way that does not mesh well with copyright law 
that is developed for dissemination of works through traditional in-
termediaries. For this reason, they provide an excellent example of 
how courts and legislators have struggled to adapt to changing user 
behavior in an intercommunicative digital world where the line blurs 
between creator and consumer.153 Memes have become a fundamen-
tal mode of expression in digital culture, embodying the transform-
ative qualities that fair use is intended to protect. This Part seeks to 
establish an operational definition and understanding of memes as 
they relate to fair use, and to situate them within digital culture. 
A. Defining Memes 
The term “meme” was first introduced by biologist Richard 
Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene in 1976.154 The word meme 
derives from the Greek mimema, meaning something which is imi-
tated, which Dawkins shortened to rhyme with gene. Dawkins de-
fined memes as a small cultural units of transmission, analogous to 
genes, which are spread from person to person by copying or imita-
tion that include specific signifiers such as melodies, catchphrases 
and clothing fashions.155 According to Limor Shifman, like genes, 
memes are replicators that are constantly subject to variation, com-
petition, selection, and retention.156 As different memes compete 
with one another for attention, only those that are suited to their so-
ciocultural environment are propagated quickly and successfully, 
i.e. going viral. Michele Knobel and Colin Lankshear contend that 
the word meme is employed by Internet users mainly to describe the 
rapid uptake and spread of a ‘‘particular idea presented as a written 
 
153 Paul Booth argues that fans’ treatment of copyrighted works “transgress the line 
between production and consumption, and more importantly, alter our interpretation of that 
boundary.” BOOTH, supra note 40, at 180. 
154 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 171 (1976). 
155 Limor Shifman, Memes in a Digital World: Reconciling with a Conceptual 
Troublemaker, 18 J. COMPUT.-MEDIATED COMM. 362, 363 (2013). 
156 Id. 
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text, image, language ‘move’, or some other unit of cultural 
‘stuff’.’’157 
Internet memes defy rigid categorization, but establishing a def-
inition is necessary to analyze them through the lens of copyright 
law.158 Bradley Wiggins defines internet memes as: 
[a] remixed, iterated message that can be rapidly dif-
fused by members of participatory digital culture for 
the purpose of satire, parody, critique, or other dis-
cursive activity. An internet meme is a more specific 
term for the various iterations it represents, such as 
image macro memes, GIFs, hashtags, video memes, 
and more. Its function is to posit an argument, visu-
ally, in order to commence, extend, counter, or influ-
ence a discourse.159 
Shifman, in analyzing the “Leave Britney Alone” meme exam-
ple, found that hardly any of the ideas conveyed by the original 
video were further circulated by its imitators, and that the imitations 
stress a different communicative role.160 In the propagation of inter-
net memes, overt reproduction of the original image is accompanied 
by new elements which may be images or text which introduces a 
different take on the original event.161 
 
157 MICHELE KNOBEL & COLIN LANKSHEAR, A NEW LITERACIES SAMPLER 202 (2nd ed. 
2007). 
158 Bradley Wiggins notes that the modern conception of meme originated with 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, who created the neologism as a noun to convey 
cultural transmission that fully captures the connection between culture and memory. 
Wiggins distinguishes internet memes from Dawkins’ formulation based on the conception 
of imitation: the essence of internet memes is marked not by imitation, “but by the capacity 
to propose or counter a discursive argument through visual and often also verbal interplay” 
and their power to inhere a critical component of political and social interaction. Internet 
memes can vary widely in their discursiveness, but considered with the medium’s semiotic 
potential, may serve inter alia as commentary on the absurdity of the human condition or 
as an “in-joke” within a particular internet subculture. See WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 1. 
Shifman also provides a comprehensive analysis of internet memes, isolating three 
dimensions of cultural items that people can potentially imitate: content, form, and stance. 
Shifman, supra note 156, at 367. 
159 WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 11. 
160 Shifman, supra note 156, at 370–71. 
161 Id. at 371. 
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For the purposes of this Article, “internet meme” and “meme” 
refer interchangeably to the same phenomenon. An important aspect 
of the meme format is that it leaves certain premises of an argument 
unstated, allowing the audience to implant their own knowledge and 
lived experience into the expression of the meme. As such, it sup-
ports further expression and semiotic richness rather than being a 
mere imitation of an earlier idea. This reliance on unstated premises 
also has the effect of making memes of obscure subcultures arcane 
to non-members. This definition is not all-encompassing of what 
might be popularly considered a “meme.” Other phenomena exist 
within digital culture adjacent to the internet meme or have memetic 
qualities. This Article focuses solely on audiovisual memes as those 
memetic behaviors that fall outside the above definition are gener-
ally self-referential of internet culture, and will generally not be sub-
ject to claims of infringement in the same manner as those that draw 
on external referents.162 
Memes are fundamentally communicative. For the purpose of 
fair use analysis, memes may be grouped into four broad categories, 
three of which engage significant copyright concerns: 
(1) Image Macros, which caption direct reproduc-
tions of existing visual and audiovisual works for 
commentative effect and vary to the extent they alter 
 
162 For example, one internet phenomena that is not considered is “copypasta” (for 
copy/paste). The format consists almost exclusively of text and is commonly seen on 
imageboards such as 4chan and Reddit. A user will post a script almost instantly 
recognizable to insiders with one or more slight alterations. See e.g., To Be Fair, You Have 
to Have a Very High IQ to Understand Rick and Morty, KNOW YOUR MEME (July 17, 
2017), https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/to-be-fair-you-have-to-have-a-very-high-iq-
to-understand-rick-and-morty [https://perma.cc/RE5E-BQME]. Arguably, another 
category that may possess memetic status includes indignant responses to ignorant or 
bombastic claims on social media. For example, “OK Boomer” (to signify that the person 
making the claim too old and detached to understand the problems of young people), “Sir 
this is a Wendy’s” (to signify that the person making the claim is doing so in the wrong 
forum or in an unnecessarily dramatic manner), or calling the person making the claim 
“Karen” (signifying the archetypal soccer mom, demanding to speak to the manager of a 
waged employee out of a sense of entitlement) or “Kyle” (signifying a person who is quick 
to anger, and embodying traits of toxic masculinity). While these phenomena are no doubt 
worthy of further academic research, these kinds of memes find no nexus with fair use or 
fair dealing and have been intentionally omitted from the analysis. 
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the underlying meaning or message of the original 
work; 
(2) Exploitables, which rely on direct reproductions 
of works as a single frame or series of frames in 
which users can add dialog or label objects within the 
frame to explicate a relationship between objects and 
subjects;163 
(3) Edits, which visually transform original works by 
adding elements into existing scenes or relocating 
subjects into unfamiliar or ironic surroundings; and 
(4) Self-referential or Standalone memes, which of-
ten utilize and remix crudely drawn characters, ref-
erencing digital culture which generally do not en-
gage significant copyright concerns and will not be 
discussed in this Article. 164 
The first two categories either directly reproduce or allow easy 
modification to the underlying image requiring few technical skills 
that the average private user could easily grasp,165 while the third 
can be executed with widely available software such as Pho-
toshop.166 
 
163 Exploitables, KNOW YOUR MEME (Apr. 10, 2009) https://knowyourmeme.com/ 
memes/exploitables [https://perma.cc/K4X2-LC2W]. Exploitables differ from Image 
Macros in that they often explicate the relationship between objects or subjects in the 
frame, whereas image macros may contain a single central theme such as a specific reaction 
or attitude. 
164 This category includes some “old memes” such as the Advice Animals series, which 
depicted an animal on a bi-color radial background. See, for example, Trollface, Rage 
Comics, Wojak, and also “old memes” such as Bad Luck Brian, Courage Wolf, and 
Socially Awkward Penguin. This final category will not be analyzed as copyright issues 
are not triggered by these generally authorless, collaborative memes that do not rely on 
mediated images or videos, but they are instructive as they represent the purest expression 
of “free play” with images that effectively form the public domain for meme generation. 
These are often drawn by the individuals that author the work and are presumed to have 
given consent for widespread sharing on social media. 
165 See e.g., Well Yes, But Actually No, MEME GENERATOR, https://imgflip.com/ 
memegenerator [https://perma.cc/U52X-BRS9]; MEME GENERATOR, https://meme-
generator.com [https://perma.cc/KL6G-9S2Y]; MAKE A MEME.ORG, https://makea 
meme.org [https://perma.cc/S3GD-DPFE]. 
166 The definition of internet memes employed in this Article is inclusive of video, image, 
and GIF variants. One example of a video meme that would be considered under the “edits” 
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(1) Image Macros  
Figure 1                         Fig-
ure 2                       
 






category is the Shooting Star video meme, which edits a video of someone jumping or 
falling, only for their surroundings to change to outer space, underwater, or any other 
background for dramatic effect. The potentially infringing nature of this meme comes not 
from use of the video content, which is generally user-generated and unlikely to qualify for 
copyright alone, but the distinctive use of a short clip from a sound recording. The 2008 
song “Shooting Stars” by the Australian electronic duo Bag Raiders is reproduced at the 
moment the subject on screen falls or jumps. Common subjects include runway models or 
performing artists that mistakenly find the edge of the stage. This meme is best categorized 
as an edit. See e.g., Shooting Stars, KNOW YOUR MEME (June 21, 2020), 
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/shooting-stars [https://perma.ccBMC8-SY97]. When 
asked for comment, Bag Raiders said they were “chuffed” that the meme had exposed their 
song to such a large audience. This may be an important consideration for the fourth factor 
analysis, as appearance in a meme may promote the original work—though this raises 
issues of properly attributing unaltered portions of the work. Know Your Meme notes that 
the song has more than 13 million views on YouTube and appears in Katy Perry’s music 
video “Swish Swish” at 2:10. Katy Perry, Swish Swish (Official) ft. Nicki Minaj, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://youtu.be/iGk5fR-t5AU?t=130 [https://perma.cc/C5VP-DU9F]. 
GIFs will more often than not fall within the “direct reproduction” category. While the 
format does not lend itself well to visual edits, it has significant utility recontextualized as 
a discursive medium. They may be juxtaposed with other works either within the GIF or 
as visually distinct part of an insular whole or used as a means of direct commentary in the 
comments section of GIF-enabled platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. 
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Figure 3                                          Figure 4 
Oprah Winfrey’s You Get A Car Memes.167 
 
Image Macros—perhaps the most common type of meme—en-
compass a spectrum of captioned direct reproductions of copy-
righted works ranging from those that transform the message or 
meaning of the original work with some degree of social commen-
tary, to “reaction images” which are instead used to augment the 
user’s own expression.168 There are a number of enduring Image 
Macro memes, but many draw upon current events and recent works 
of popular culture, sometimes captioning an image only through an 
online platform’s user interface. While utilizing a still image from 
an audiovisual work or photograph for purposes of self-expression 
rather than to entertain or to inform arguably does alter the purpose 
of the use from the original, those that use the format to create new 
information, insights, and understandings (in the lingo of the US 
Second and Ninth Circuits) will have a greater claim to transforma-
tiveness than reaction images. In this case, the Oprah memes in Fig-
ures 1-3 alter the meaning or message to a greater extent than Figure 
 
167 Oprah’s ‘You Get A Car’, KNOW YOUR MEME (Apr. 5, 2013), https://know 
yourmeme.com/memes/oprahs-you-get-a-car [https://perma.cc/6VVX-AEGN]. On 
September 13th, 2004, Oprah Winfrey gave away new Pontiac G6 cars to her audience, 
spawning a surprisingly durable image macros meme and a number of video parodies on 
TV programs such as Conan and Robot Chicken. This Image Macro has extended recently 
to themes such as COVID-19 quarantine orders and the legalization of gay marriage in 
countries that criminalize homosexuality. While originally focused on Oprah’s gifting of 
cars to her audience, the format is frequently extended to any experience, idea, or debate 
that occupies a prominent position in a country’s collective psyche or identity. 
168 This category includes “Old Memes” such as the “Advice Animal” format Image 
Macros. 
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4, which is a “reaction image” type of meme, using Oprah Winfrey’s 
expression to amplify the user’s own expression. 
(2) Exploitables 
Figure 5  
Distracted Boyfriend Meme, posted by Leader of the Brexit Party 
Nigel Farage to Facebook.169 Photographer: Antonio Guillem 
(Stock Image). 
 
Exploitable memes reproduce a single frame or multiple frames 
from a photo or audiovisual work as a template, differing from Im-
age Macros in that they label subjects or objects in the frame to ex-
plicate a relationship between elements in the frame, or to create a 
dialogue between two characters. The visual relationship between 
objects or subjects in the frame allow meme creators to discuss other 
concepts, often wholly unrelated to the original scene. By labelling 
subjects in the frame, meme creators leverage one’s understanding 
of the visual relationship between characters to suggest an analo-
gous relationship in another form.170 
 
169 Distracted Boyfriend, KNOW YOUR MEME (Jan. 3, 2021), 
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/distracted-boyfriend [https://perma.cc/45VB-
RAWL]. See also WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 47. 
170 This category also includes exploitable “comic”-style memes that add dialog to a 
series of images, relying on the expressions and actions of characters to display countering 
sides of a debate. See e.g., American Chopper Argument, KNOW YOUR MEME (Mar. 28, 
2018), https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/american-chopper-argument [https://perma.cc/ 
W5RS-P53Z]. 
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(3) Edits 
Figure 6                                            Figure 7 
 
Figure 8                                           Figure 9 
Rhianna’s Met Gala Dress Edits171 
 
Edits are a highly creative and varied category of memes in 
which users add elements to existing scenes or remove characters 
from their original context. Often drawing from audiovisual works 
and photographs taken of notable people, they represent a more la-
bor-intensive form of memes which creates new aesthetics and vis-
ually alters works in ways that are more immediately cognizable 
under transformative use doctrine. They are also generally the cate-
gory that comes closest to parody, as a prominent element—or the 
 
171 Know Your Meme, “Rhianna’s Met Gala Dress,” May 5th, 2015. https://knowyou 
rmeme.com/memes/rihannas-met-gala-dress [https://perma.cc/G52H-AX99]; The Internet 
Speaks/Rihanna Met Gala 2015, SPITGAN MAGAZINE (May 6, 2015), 
https://blog.spitgan.com/the-internet-says-rihanna-met-gala-2015/ [https://perma.cc/MD 
5B-MB23] 
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“heart”—of the original image necessarily becomes the object of 
ridicule or derision. This category also best represents the carni-
valesque “transformative play” that consumers engage in with well-
known works and marks in meme generation.172 In line with what 
Marshall173 and Jurgenson174 have observed, these memes can con-
tribute to an integral portion of the serialization of our online public 
persona where we communicate our feelings, thoughts, emotions, 
and political ideologies. In this Figure 6 displays the original papa-
razzo photograph of Rhianna on the red carpet at the Met Gala, while 
figures 7-9 display Edits depicting the train of the dress as the  
Yellow Brick Road in The Wizard of Oz, a pizza, or an emergency 
slide of an airplane. 
The proposed typology usefully groups memes based on the use 
they make of the underlying work, offering enough precision to ap-
ply the fair use factors to each category. While Edits bear analogy 
to cases involving appropriation artists such as Richard Prince and 
Jeff Koons, Image Macros and Exploitable memes rely on a form of 
semiotic play that could be understood as the “creation of new in-
formation, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” that 
may “reasonably be perceived” by the online community,175 but  
requires a comparison between the author’s intent and the supposed 
alteration to that intent by the secondary user. Much like appropria-
tion or pop art (e.g., Andy Warhol’s Marilyn that is based on a  
single publicity photograph) that recontextualizes existing works,176 
 
172 Tan, supra note 65, at 87, 98. 
173 See generally supra note 1. 
174 JURGENSON, supra note 13. 
175 See e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 
F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 
132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998); Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). 
176 See also Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 382 F. Supp. 3d 
312 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that each of the Prince Series works may reasonably be 
perceived to be transformative of the Goldsmith Prince Photograph). More specifically, the 
court found:  
The Prince Series works can reasonably be perceived to have transformed 
Prince from a vulnerable, uncomfortable person to an iconic, larger-than-life 
figure. The humanity Prince embodies in Goldsmith’s photograph is gone. 
Moreover, each Prince Series work is immediately recognizable as a “Warhol” 
rather than as a photograph of Prince—in the same way that Warhol’s famous 
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memes that are visually transformative require less emphasis on re-
coding and reinterpreting the subtext of an original work to be con-
sidered fair use. Memes that recode and recontextualize the original 
work without visual alteration are harder to situate within existing 
fair use doctrines than those that visibly transform an underlying 
work. An internet meme can only exist if it refers to something in 
addition to the original subject matter it contains,177 existing as an 
inherently intertextual medium that draws upon the semiotic aura of 
the original work. Most works are indirectly intertextual by adher-
ence to a genre, or directly by way of citation, allusions, parody, 
pastiche, etc., but memes often directly appropriate earlier expres-
sions to draw upon their cultural symbolic relevance,178 relying on 
the audience’s widespread familiarity and relatability with underly-
ing content to emphasize their message.179 Though internet plat-
forms and social media act as the creative engine for meme content, 
they may be further disseminated throughout the physical world.180 
B. Memes, Semiotics, and Digital Culture 
The last time the US Supreme Court ruled on the fair use doc-
trine was in Campbell in 1994 before the advent of the internet. 
Since then, the internet has evolved from a repository of facts, data, 
and documents to a global social community of users engaging with 
 
representations of Marilyn Monroe and Mao are recognizable as “Warhols,” 
not as realistic photographs of those persons. 
Id. at 326. 
177 WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 33. 
178 Id. at 35. 
179 Kara Podraza, When Is a Little Too Much: The De Minimis Doctrine and Its 
Implications for Online Communication Tools, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 550 (2018). 
180    One of the most enduring memes is Pepe the Frog, having made his debut in Matt 
Furie’s Boys’ Club cartoon in 2005. The character saw consistent use as a meme on social 
media platforms and imageboards such as 4chan for a number of years as a symbol of 
loneliness and alienation, before becoming a symbol of the alt-right during the 2016 United 
States Presidential Election. More recently, Pepe has become a symbol for pro-democracy 
protestors in Hong Kong protesting China’s extradition bill and featured in the 2020 
documentary Feels Good Man, which documents Furie’s attempt to save his character from 
the alt right. Pepe the Frog, KNOW YOUR MEME, https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/ 
pepe-the-frog [https://perma.cc/G9RH-6N2D]. 
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each other.181 As the world became more networked and as new 
technologies have forever changed the way consumers interact with 
protected works,182 the copyright law that governs the fair use of 
those works has not kept pace.183 
Broadly speaking, digital culture is the interaction of people 
through computers and mobile devices. While commonly under-
stood to be related primarily to social media, the concept extends to 
immediate access to the full breadth of humanity’s digitized 
knowledge and the ability to stream video and contribute content on 
various platforms.184 The term “digital culture” distinguishes from 
earlier forms of media and reflects new ways in which users interact 
with copyrighted works, including user-generated content (“UGC”), 
algorithmically curated newsfeeds, and the role of social media “in-
fluencers.”185 Furthermore, this digital network means so much 
 
181 Jeff Bercovici, Who Coined ‘Social Media’? Web Pioneers Compete for Credit, 
FORBES (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2010/12/09/who-
coined-social-media-web-pioneers-compete-for-credit/ [https://perma.cc/6AT9-22BS], 
cited in Tim Kingsbury, Copyright Paste: The Unfairness of Sticking to Transformative 
Use in the Digital Age, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (2018). 
182 Holland, supra note 66, at 337. Here, Holland observes:  
New technologies that not only enable increased audience engagement with 
cultural works, but also facilitate the use of these “raw materials” to produce 
new works have made fair use more controversial. At another level, these 
technologies have made visible an audience, not of passive content consumers, 
but of active participants in the discourse around and about those works. 
183 Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustiala call this development the second digital 
disruption. The first was defined by the development of novel distribution methods, 
whereas the second is characterized by two-way data flows between producer and 
consumer. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption: 
Streaming and the Dawn of Data Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (2019). 
184 WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 21. Wikipedia is an excellent example of the internet’s 
collaborative potential: the online free encyclopedia is available in 309 languages, written 
and edited entirely by volunteers. People now carry powerful computers and high-
resolution cameras everywhere they go in their cell phones. This facilitates the opportunity 
to infringe copyright in situations such as making video and audio recordings of 
performances and their subsequent reposting, screenshotting copyrighted works, and 
sharing works. This development was certainly not in the contemplation of legislative 
drafters when they tabled copyright acts, which explains in part the continued legislative 
debate surrounding fair use, fair dealing and other exceptions across the world. 
185 Id. at 22. Wiggins elaborates upon the idea of participatory culture, asserting that this 
earlier conception of human interaction with social media reflects an optimistic and 
perhaps naïve conception of a “utopian plateau”, rather than one where not all users have 
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more than technological interconnectedness—it has been argued to 
resemble the “folk” relations of Mikhail Bakhtin’s carnival.186 So-
cial media platforms like Facebook and Instagram can function like 
a carnival which “subverts the very hierarchies that impose the kind 
of distinction seen in the classes of ‘official culture’ and ‘unofficial 
culture’, ‘aristocracy’, and ‘peasants’, implied in the modern intel-
lectual property system.”187 As Bakhtin explains, during the dura-
tion of the carnival, “there is a temporary suspension of all hierar-
chic distinctions and barriers among men and of certain norms and 
prohibitions of usual life.”188 Insofar as the laws of copyright are 
concerned, the carnivalesque atmosphere of social media gives life 
to a network that simultaneously confounds conventional under-
standings of copyright law and reinvigorates a polyphonous public 
sphere. 
Ultimately, the digital realm is a readily available carnivalesque 
arena for individuals to express themselves and to make—and con-
stantly remake—an online public persona; and it is increasingly be-
coming a communicative space that is more readily governed by 
culturally permissible norms of behavior than by clearly articulated 
legal rules. By posting, sharing, and creatively altering what they 
find online, social media users use readily available images—espe-
cially well-known images imbued with cultural meanings—to con-
struct their public selves.189 Social media also allows people to con-
nect to other people and businesses, facilitating debate of socioeco-
nomic and political issues, among other things. Wiggins asserts that 
culture, whether at a societal level or varied levels such as pop cul-
ture, counterculture, etc., necessitates a shared understanding and a 
level of reliable and systematic sustainability.190 Embedded within 
 
equal access, entry, and impact. This also reflects that while traditional methods of 
broadcasting were typically a one-way street, modern dissemination also receives 
information from the consumer in the form of viewership and other metadata. See also 
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 183. 
186 See, e.g., JOHANNA GIBSON, CREATING SELVES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
NARRATION OF CULTURE 28–29 (2006) (referring to MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND HIS 
WORLD (Helene Iswolsky trans., 1984). 
187 Id. at 28 (internal citations omitted). 
188 Id. 
189    Id.  
190 WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 7 (emphasis in original). 
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that shared understanding is an “in-progress and evolving systems 
of interacting, producing, co-creating meaning.”191 Internet memes 
remix and recode images and videos with meanings often substan-
tially different from the original expression, evident in the caption-
ing of Oprah memes (Figures 1-4) and the edits of Rhianna’s Dress 
(Figures 7-9).192 
Memes that are focused on the creation of shared meanings by 
commenting on relatable and broadly applicable socio-political 
themes largely external to the self (such as a global pandemic or 
Brexit), and “reaction image”-style memes (e.g. Figure 4) are simply 
different aspects of individual expression that enables users to con-
struct and promote their idealized digital persona through identifi-
cation with the semiotic coding of the original work.193 By utilizing 
well-known characters or works to portray their emotions or reac-
tions rather than a selfie or photo of themselves, individuals leverage 
the near-universal semiotic coding and instantly-recognizable fea-
tures of the original194—at the same time reinforcing that individ-
ual’s role as a participant in a mediated digital culture. The carni-
valesque atmosphere of social media has effectively broken down 
the formalities of hierarchy and the differences between social clas-
ses, ages, and nationalities, “replacing established traditions and 
canons with a ‘free and familiar’ mode of social interaction based 
on principles of mutual cooperation, solidarity and equality.”195  
Nathanial Noda also argues that copyright law ought to “keep pace 
with changing times and practices by recognizing that an author im-
plicitly cedes certain interpretive rights to the general public when 
he or she introduces a work into the stream of public discourse.”196 
Fair use is intended to balance a broader societal interest against the 
 
191 Id. 
192 Wiggins proposes a different understanding of “remix” culture in the context of 
internet memes: “Remixing occurs as a necessary step in the realization of an internet 
meme’s process of generating and sustaining meaning which is co-constructed between the 
(unimportant or unknowable) author of a given internet meme and the audience consuming 
the message.” Id. at 13. 
193 Tan, supra note 15, at 360–61. 
194 Id. 
195 Gardiner, supra note 42, at 30. 
196 Nathaniel T. Noda, Copyright Retold: How Interpretive Rights Foster Creativity and 
Justify Fan-Based Activities, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 987, 991 (2010). 
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exclusive rights of the copyright owner.197 Even before the advent 
of the internet, Rosemary Coombe had already highlighted the  
potential of intellectual property laws to stifle dialogic uses of some 
of the most “powerful, prevalent, and accessible cultural forms.”198 
Denying meme creators—especially if they were private non-com-
mercial individuals—protection under fair use risks further impov-
erishing the cultural public domain and subjecting social media  
users to copyright infringement liability or harassment by rights 
owners. 
C. Emerging Norms and Online Incentives 
Cultural norms of fair use in the digital realm vary greatly from 
the legal framework imposed by copyright law in 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
The divergence of these norms is reinforced by a virtual absence of 
copyright enforcement against the private users that create internet 
memes. Insofar as the use of copyrighted works is concerned, pri-
vate non-commercial individual internet users perceive that a “free 
culture” permeates the internet.199 If something is published online, 
such users often see no harm in reposting those works on different 
websites or social media platforms.200 This perceived “free” culture 
online naturally conflicts with copyright holders’ exclusive rights to 
control reproduction and distribution of their works.201 Ultimately, 
 
197 As Jeanne Fromer and Mark Lemley note: “IP owners’ efforts to take control over the 
use of their works in completely different markets create the biggest problems for the IP 
system.” Allowing IP owners to stifle meme creation through enforcement of copyright 
would not further the goals of copyright law. See Jeanne C. Fromer and Mark A. Lemley, 
The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1291–92 
(2014). 
198 Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual 
Property Law and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1855 (1991). See also 
Holland, supra note 66, at 338 (“Social semiotics offers an alternate conception of 
transformativeness in which social value is manifest in the process of meaning-making that 
occurs as individuals and interpretive communities engage the work. Copyright’s 
commitment to the enrichment of society can be best evaluated in the context of this 
process of semiosis as a distinct question apart from the creation of new authorial rights.”). 
199 Mary W. S. Wong, Transformative User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: 
Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075, 1081 (2009). 
See also Lauren Levinson, Adapting Fair Use to Reflect Social Media Norms: A Joint 
Proposal, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1038 (2017). 
200 Brittany Curtis, Copyright vs. Social Media: Who Will Win, 20 I.P. L. BULL. 81 (2016). 
201 Levinson, supra note 199. 
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the seemingly permissionless nature of the internet (and more par-
ticularly of social media platforms like Instagram and Facebook), 
combined with the breakneck speed in which users can download, 
alter, and reshare content, have combined to create a semi-anarchic 
system where emergent norms constrain user behavior to a greater 
extent than do legal and regulatory structures such as copyright law. 
The rules and design of specific platforms also constrain and in-
fluence user behavior. Moran Yemini notes that social media oper-
ates in a symbiotic relationship with its users—they depend on UGC 
while at the same time providing the architecture and setting the 
rules for how that content can be shared and interacted with.202 This 
creates an environment in which users are nudged to share new con-
tent that they did not create themselves, sending mixed signals that 
unfairly expose sharers to allegations of copyright infringement.203 
Social media platforms designed to impel user sharing and commu-
nity interaction while simultaneously facilitating the effortless dis-
semination of content, whether copyrighted or not, reinforce the 
user’s impression of a free and permissionless sharing culture on the 
internet. Norms of attribution among the denizens of digital culture 
exist in what Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman call a “low-
IP equilibrium,”204 paralleling extra-legal norms of attribution and 
 
202 Moran Yemini, The New Irony of Free Speech, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119, 
162 (2018). 
203 WIGGINS, supra note 18, at 87. He observes: “Digital culture often operates on an 
assumption that is unique to its essence but dissonant with respect to real-world law and 
practice. This assumption posits that what is available or searchable is equally useable, 
remixable, etc. In other words, if I can access it, I can use it, drag it off the website, 
download the video, remix it, etc. in order to offer my own version of whatever it happens 
to be. By and large, this approach largely defines much of digital culture in terms of 
common practice. Yet, laws remain in place despite the grab-and-share, copy/paste, etc. 
aspects of digital culture.” Id. 
204 Memes seem to be an example of Raustiala and Sprigman’s “low-IP equilibrium 
situation,” in which a lack of IP protection spurs on greater innovation and creativity and 
leads creators within the equilibrium to develop extra-legal norms that parallel copyright. 
Raustiala and Sprigman examine the role of copying in the fashion industry, finding that 
the pervasiveness of copying by fast-fashion brands accelerates the fashion cycle. As trends 
become available to the masses, fashion cognoscenti seek out emerging trends. Memes 
share a similar cycle of emergence, popularity, and trend death, but these cycles are often 
driven by the media they draw from. Memes will often draw from recent films, series, or 
news events, often finding widespread popularity before fading as new developments in 
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enforcement in high-end cuisine and stand-up comedy.205 In digital 
culture, norms of attribution manifest among artists, meme-aggre-
gating accounts, and private individuals alike as a means of gaining 
a substantial social media following and the benefits that accrue 
from being “Instafamous.”206 
 
the social world spur on further meme creation. While not all memes become widely 
known, a small number endure well beyond the popular discussion of their underlying 
work. Analogously, memes thrive upon the low-IP equilibrium created by a legislative void 
and lack of enforcement. See generally KAL RAUSTIALA AND CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE 
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2015). 
205 See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should 
Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 
1152 (2007). See also Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1791 (2008). Sprigman explains how a system of intellectual property 
norms has developed independent of any legal framework in stand-up comedy, a field that 
has not traditionally been protected by copyright law. He notes that comedians’ IP norms 
“generally parallel those ordered by copyright law, namely authorship, ownership, transfer 
of rights, fair use and other exceptions to ownership.” The informal sanctions imposed on 
joke-stealing comics can be analogized to accounts that “steal” memes from other accounts, 
which reached its most prominent example in 2019 when meme content creators and 
aggregators sanctioned a popular Instagram meme account “@fuckjerry” with public 
shaming for taking content without permission or attribution under the hashtag 
“#fuckfuckjerry.” However, while joke-stealing can result in hampered career prospects 
for comics, social media accounts may just lose a small portion of their following. The 
tendency of bigger accounts appropriating from smaller ones carries a similar “clout” 
problem to Sprigman’s analysis of joke-theft by popular comics. Id. at 1824. In the case of 
@fuckjerry, his following went from 14.3 million to 14 million followers, and he released 
a public statement promising to get advanced permission to repost memes. See also Alexis 
Madrigal, “The Limits of Extremely Online Organizing,” THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/fuckfuckjerry-the-limits-of-
extremely-online-organizing/582556/ [https://perma.cc/X6SS-FHBQ]. 
206 Norms of attribution have developed in part from creators wanting to be recognized 
for their creativity, but also due to the market principles at work on social media that reward 
accounts with large followings with potential endorsement and advertising revenues, free 
product testing, and a range of social benefits that accrue through being “instafamous.” 
Some meme accounts will watermark their original content, such as Instagram user 
@sonny5ideup’s use of translucent fried eggs to prevent meme stealing. In this way, 
watermarking content operates as a trademark, while also providing attribution to the 
creators in a digital culture in which memes are shared, reposted, and published on other 
platforms. While influencers and other celebrities on social media have a significant 
number of revenue opportunities such as sponsorships and endorsements as a result of their 
marketable personality, meme accounts are more limited to acting as advertisers or creating 
meme-related merchandise. See Taylor Lorenz, “Memes Are Becoming Harder to 
Monetize,” THE ATLANTIC (MAY 31, 2018), 
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III. ARE MEMES FAIR USE? 
A. Purpose and Character of the Use 
The first factor analyzes two elements: (1) the extent to which 
the secondary work is different in purpose or character from the 
original work,207 or whether it transforms the original with “new ex-
pression, meaning, or message”,208 or where the original has been 
used in the “creation of new information, new aesthetics, new in-
sights and understandings” that may “reasonably be perceived”;209 
and (2) the commerciality of the use. A commercial use may still be 
fair, but it must be sufficiently or highly transformative in order to 
counterbalance its commerciality for the first factor to weigh in fa-
vor of fair use. The commerciality of the online personas of celebri-
ties, influencers, and meme-aggregating accounts may impart a 
commercial character to their expression, particularly when that 
same online account is used to promote products or services.210 
However, this commerciality tends to be subservient to a particular 
meme’s significant transformation of the underlying work. 
 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/memes-are-becoming-harder-
to-monetize/561578/ [https://perma.cc/QD2J-T2NT]. For a discussion on the changing 
nature of contemporary fame, see DAVID TAN, THE COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF FAME: 
A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PASSING OFF 22–26 (2017). 
207 17 U.S.C. §107. See also TCA TV Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 182 (2d Cir. 
2016) (“The only purpose served by the extent of defendants’ taking is identically comedic 
to that of the original authors, that is, to have two performers expand on a singular joke in 
order to generate increasing audience laughter.”); VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 
723, 742 (9th Cir. 2019) (“That Digs makes these images searchable does not 
fundamentally change their original purpose when produced by VHT: to artfully depict 
rooms and properties.”). 
208 Campbell v. Rose-Acuff Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 596, 579 (1994). 
209 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 
253 (2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp. Inc., 150 F.3d 138, 142 (2d 
Cir. 1998); Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). 
210 The Supreme Court ruled in Harper & Row that “[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit 
distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user 
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary 
price.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). A court 
may find that in posting copyrighted meme content, commercial users derive benefits 
through increased consumer engagement with the brand whether there is a marketing 
message or not; and quasi-commercial users such as celebrities, influencers and meme-
aggregating accounts similarly seek to profit through posting or reposting these memes 
whether directly through paid endorsements or indirectly through free merchandise. 
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As pointed out above, individuals invariably engage in differing 
degrees of “transformative play” on social media in the digital 
era211—and memes are an important part of this social communica-
tion. Meme creators utilize well-known works or characters to draw 
upon their symbolic value as raw materials for their own expression, 
or as a means of recoding, subverting or criticizing the dominant or 
conventional interpretations of those works.212 Internet memes re-
sult from a process of audience interaction and participation with 
some of the most prevalent and salient cultural forms available to 
the public, in a way that “triggers unexpected social responses, cul-
tivating new and expansive cultural meanings, messages, and in-
sights.”213 They are an example of precisely the kind of socially val-
uable expressive activities that should be permitted within the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of “breathing space” for secondary uses.214 
According to Rosenblatt, “the carnivalesque engages in dialogue by 
assigning a folk meaning to (religious or other authoritarian) signs, 
resisting a power structure that would assign a monologic meaning 
to those same signs.”215 In fair use-speak, this would require that the 
“creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and un-
derstandings” may “reasonably be perceived” in the repurposing of 
the original signs.216 Image Macro memes, as exemplified by the 
 
211 See e.g., Tan, supra note 54. See also Tan, supra note 53. 
212 Holland, supra note 66, at 338 (discussing transformative use as a social semiotic 
process and First Amendment concerns); Tan, supra note 15, at 361 (“Like famous 
trademarks, the copyrighted character signifier/signified relationship would have become 
universally codified for the audience; the audience will automatically and consistently 
think of the coded meanings and values (the signified) when they are exposed to the 
character signifiers.”). 
213 Holland, supra note 66, at 361 (“Can audience engagement with a work matter? What 
if audience interaction with and about the work triggers unexpected social responses, 
cultivating new and expansive cultural meanings, messages, and insights? Does 
accommodating this work, as a necessary constituent of the social value of new expression? 
If fair use is taken seriously as a doctrine of accommodation, distinct from monopoly 
incentives, then the answer is yes.”). 
214 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
215 Rosenblatt, supra note 11, at 388. Rosenblatt also comments that “fair uses dismember 
works and bring them closer so that they can be examined, experimented with, critiqued, 
laughed at. Each of these genres ‘profanes’ sacralized (here, copyrighted) symbols by 
playing with them.” Id. at 389. 
216 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–07 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 
244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 141 
(2d Cir. 1998); Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Oprah memes above, as well as Exploitable memes such as Nigel 
Farage’s pro-Brexit Distracted Boyfriend memes represent non-vis-
ually transformative uses that nonetheless use the underlying work 
as “raw material” for political, social, and cultural expressions—
which all also enjoy First Amendment protection. 
Holland compellingly argues that the search for authorial intent 
in the secondary uses that demand fair use protection is misguided, 
noting that copyright’s monopoly-incentive is often wrongly im-
ported into fair use’s guarantee of breathing space within the con-
fines of copyright law.217 This is bolstered by the Second Circuit’s 
current jurisprudence when assessing visual works in focusing on 
what may “reasonably be perceived” by the audience regardless of 
authorial intent.218 Transformative use doctrine as applied by the 
Second and Ninth Circuits suggests that courts may be willing con-
sider evidence of semiotic transformation, whether visual or not. 
Tan suggests that current approach in these Circuits “appears to be 
able to accommodate the shifting of the transformativeness inquiry 
from locating an authorial presence or authorial activity, to one of 
reader interpretation, i.e. whether one might reasonably perceive the 
creation of ‘new information, new aesthetics, new insights and un-
derstandings.’” 219 He emphasizes that “even a visually non-trans-
formative work may be contextually transformative because it has 
introduced new ideas fundamentally different from the original.”220 
By recognizing the role of audience interpretation (and reinterpreta-
tion) in fair use, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ approaches may ac-
commodate both visually and non-visually transformative memes. 
Considering Figures 1-3, a still image taken from an iconic 
Oprah television episode is used to comment on issues such as gay 
marriage and the COVID-19 pandemic, including its social effects 
such as homeschooling as a result of nationwide lockdowns and 
 
217 Holland, supra note 66, at 381 (“Valuable new expression—new meanings and new 
messages—created by social interaction with the work can occur entirely apart from the 
author.”). 
218 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. See also ROBERT HODGE & GUNTHER KRESS, SOCIAL 
SEMIOTICS 12 (1988) (“Meaning is always negotiated in the semiotic process, never simply 
imposed inexorably from above by an omnipotent author through an absolute code.”). 
219 Tan, supra note 54, at 84. 
220 Id. at 85. 
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school closures.221 No visual alteration has occurred save for the ad-
dition of a caption, and yet, the audience’s reasonable perception of 
a transformative change in purpose or character is likely. While the 
original work depicted Oprah’s gift of new automobiles, her state-
ment “You get a car!” has been playfully recoded to deal with cur-
rent issues, providing a valuable meme template for the creation of 
“new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings.” Figure 4 depicts a Reaction Image-style Image Macro meme 
and varies from the earlier examples based on the use it makes of 
the underlying work.222 While earlier examples recoded Oprah’s fa-
mous quote, Figure 4 removes the original context entirely, using 
her image to augment the user’s own expression of the same emo-
tion. In doing so, the meme is arguably “contextually transforma-
tive” by taking a small portion of a TV entertainment work and using 
it as a digital self-expression.223 Figure 4 can be distinguished from 
TCA v. McCollum which held that the use of Abbott and Costello’s 
famous “Who’s on First” skit was copied for the same dramatic pur-
pose as it was originally written. Figure 4 manifests a substantially 
different purpose than the original: from entertaining the audience 
on television to communicating one’s emotions in an ironic manner 
during a pandemic lockdown. As noted above, users repurpose well-
known characters and works to amplify their digital self-expression 
and to affirm their participation within digital culture. 
Figure 5 depicts former UKIP and current Brexit Party leader 
Nigel Farage’s Facebook post discussing an overtly political mes-
sage.224 While Farage’s use of the image in a meme may not be per-
missible under the UK’s categorical fair dealing provision, it would 
almost certainly qualify as a transformative use in the US, despite 
the minimal visual alteration. The original stock image was ostensi-
bly intended for licensed use in online blogs or news forums for its 
 
221 Oprah’s ‘You Get A Car’, supra note 168. 
222 Id. 
223 Tan, supra note 54, at 85. The change in context alone may not be dispositive of a fair 
use inquiry, but it often facilitates a change in purpose. While arguably less transformative 
and further from the shelter of constitutionally-protected speech, the radical change in 
context and use suggest a moderate-to-high degree of transformation that can neutralize or 
displace any marginally-commercial character that may vary depending on the user (i.e., 
private users vs. influencers vs. business accounts). 
224 Distracted Boyfriend, supra note 170. 
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ability to present a romantic betrayal simplistically and plainly, a 
message that it has successfully and exhaustively captured. Subse-
quent meme usage of the image as an Exploitable meme labels the 
three characters to explicate a relationship between three related 
concepts, in this case Italy’s desirous gaze at a Brexit-style option. 
The “creation of . . . new insights and understandings” by making 
use of an image limited in its potential meanings for political ends 
is a clear transformation of purpose and character of the original 
work. Brammer v. Violent Hues, which concerned the unlicensed 
use of a photograph online can be distinguished from the transfor-
mations in Figures 1-3 and 5 in that the secondary use utilized the 
photograph for the content itself, while the memes have drawn upon 
the earlier works to communicate new information, insights, and un-
derstandings of political, social, and cultural issues.225 Figures 7-9 
display Edits of the original red carpet photograph of Rhianna’s 
dress from the 2015 Met Gala, depicted as the Yellow Brick Road 
from The Wizard of Oz, a pepperoni pizza, and an aircraft emergency 
slide.226 The original image (Figure 6) depicts Rihanna in a re-
splendent haute couture dress designed by Guo Pei, while the edited 
images visually criticize and ridicule the opulent over-the-top look 
in humorous ways, which calls to mind the smirking face of Leslie 
Nielsen superimposed on Demi Moore’s naked pregnant body as 
photographed by Annie Leibovitz which was found to be fair use.227 
Current transformative use jurisprudence applies most unproblem-
atically to Edits, in which visual transformation alters or recontex-
tualizes key elements in the frame to suit the secondary user’s dis-
cursive intent.228 
 
225 Brammer v. Violet Hues Prods., 922 F.3d 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2019). Figure 4 can 
likewise be distinguished from Brammer in that its use of the earlier work demonstrates a 
marked shift in purpose, from mass media to mediated self-expression. 
226 Rihanna’s Met Gala Dress, KNOW YOUR MEME (May 5, 2015), 
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/rihannas-met-gala-dress [https://perma.cc/L8K7-
ADKU]. The dress was also mocked as resembling a poured omelet and a yellow condom. 
227 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1998). 
228 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 598 (1994) warned “that courts should not accord fair use protection to profiteers who 
do no more than add a few silly words to someone else’s song or place the characters from 
a familiar work in novel or eccentric poses.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598. However, TCA 
can be distinguished on the basis that its reproduction of Abbott and Costello’s “Who’s on 
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Holland suggests that “an infringement defendant claiming this 
[social semiotics-informed] form of transformativeness would 
therefore need to produce evidence of audience engagement and the 
negotiation of new and distinct meanings around the text.”229 As a 
format, memes are an iterative form of digital expression that results 
from audience engagement with existing works that takes the form 
of either renegotiating or actively subverting the original meanings 
of those works, and so appear to be highly transformative uses under 
the first factor.230 The current transformative use analysis by the 
courts appears to be able to accommodate the protection of non-vis-
ual transformations present in Image Macro and Exploitable memes. 
While there is an apparent reinvigoration of the fourth factor in the 
Second Circuit, neither this factor nor any arguably commercial 
character of the user would seem capable of outweighing the trans-
formativeness of these categories of memes.231 
B. Nature of the Work 
The second factor examines the nature of the original work, con-
sidering that “some works are closer to the core of intended copy-
right protection than others.”232 Creative works such as audiovisual 
works and photographs receive thick copyright protection whether 
they depict fictional works or factual settings, but this factor “may 
be of limited usefulness where the creative work of art is being used 
 
First” introduced no new purpose, while Edits memes often parody original images in a 
way consistent with recent fair use rulings on the works of pop artists such as Andy Warhol, 
Jeff Koons and Richard Prince. In this case, there is a clear parodic usage that differentiates 
these Edits memes from the infringing use of “Who’s on First” in the play. 
229 Holland, supra note 66, at 391–92. 
230 Id. at 361 (“Meaning is not controlled, transmitted, or even consistent. It is, instead, 
negotiated and actualized in engagement with the audience, or, more appropriately, 
audiences.”). See also Tan, supra note 54, at 86: “Parodies, fan fiction and appropriation 
art are the best examples of trans-coding practices where an irreverent portrayal of an iconic 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work has recoded its semiotic meanings to express a 
different or counterviewpoint that creates new insights and understandings, thus rendering 
the secondary use ‘transformative’ in nature.” 
231 Holland, supra note 66, at 357 (“The fair use doctrine is not, after all, concerned with 
incentivizing the creation of new works through the grant of monopoly. Rather, the heart 
of the fair use doctrine is its ‘guarantee of breathing space within the confines of 
copyright.’”). 
232 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. 
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for a transformative purpose.”233 As demonstrated above, the  
Second and Ninth Circuits’ transformative use approach appears  
to accommodate both visual and non-visual transformations as  
employed in memes. 
Holland’s semiotic analysis of the iconic “Hope” poster featur-
ing Barack Obama found the original photograph’s typically thick 
copyright protection nevertheless yielded to a highly transformative 
secondary use.234 He argues that the original photograph could be 
described “as an attempt to capture unremarkable semiotic resources 
with powerful encoded meanings, to combine those resources and 
present the text in an unremarkable way, and to do so for the pur-
poses of conveying conventional meanings.”235 Likewise, the origi-
nal image of Oprah depicts an unremarkable (if perhaps instantly-
recognizable) talk show set, shot from a camera whose location was 
dictated by custom and necessity rather than a creative decision.  
The red-carpet photos of Rhianna utilized in the Edits (figures 6-9) 
demonstrate limited creativity or originality on the part of the pho-
tographer, whose positioning and framing of the star was most prob-
ably happenstance, after being jostled by hundreds of other photog-
raphers jockeying for a near-identical shot. Though photographs 
generally exist at the core of copyright protection, these photographs 
do not exhibit significant creativity in terms of its lighting, styling, 
subject arrangement and aesthetic choices and seem more deserving 
of thin rather than thick protection. In comparison, the stock photo-
graph used in Farage’s Facebook meme post (Figure 5) required 
slightly more creative effort than the Oprah image, including the 
wardrobe and styling of the models. Nonetheless, this factor is rarely 
dispositive in fair use, and is neutral or at best tilts very slightly 
against fair use. 
 
233 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bill Graham Archives v. 
Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006)). The Second Circuit held “the 
second fair-use factor has limited weight in our analysis because Koons used Blanch’s 
work in a transformative manner to comment on her image’s social and aesthetic meaning 
rather than to exploit its creative virtues.” Id.  
234 Holland, supra note 66, at 385. 
235 Id. 
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C. Amount and Substantiality of Use 
The third factor analysis considers whether “‘the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole’ are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copy-
ing.”236 The Supreme Court held in Campbell that while the nature 
of parody requires some taking from the “heart” of the work, exces-
sive copying of its expressive elements may weigh against a finding 
of fair use, especially where the secondary use is not sufficiently 
transformative under the first factor or provides a market substitute 
for the original under the fourth.237 The extent to which non-parodic 
and non-satirical uses may borrow from the original is less certain. 
Given that memes often borrow from the “heart” of a work, there 
needs to be sufficient justification for the copying—without which 
the third factor seems initially to favor copyright owners. 
Figures 1-3 and 7-9 (Oprah’s You Get a Car! and Rhianna’s Met 
Gala Dress) display clear parodic intent in their repurposing of, and 
reference to, elements of the original work, which provides justifi-
cation to copy from the “heart” of the work.238 That considered, the 
amount and substantiality taken from Oprah’s daytime talk show is 
minimal—one frame out of a single episode. However, the Edits of 
Rhianna utilize all or a significant portion of the original photograph 
but would likely be justified in their copying as a parodic fair use of 
the original.239 Internet meme creators are rarely identified, but their 
use of current or well-known pop-culture works and other user-
found images finds its justification in the process of audience inter-
pretation and meaning-making within digital culture. Figures 4 and 
5’s use can be justified on these grounds, despite their lack of com-
ment on or reference to the original work. Highly transformative use 
diminishes the weight of other factors such as the amount and 
 
236 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)). 
237 Id. 
238 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
239 The Second Circuit cautioned that “[a] secondary work may modify the original 
without being transformative,” but “‘works that add something new’ and [present] images 
with a fundamentally different aesthetic will be considered transformative.” See Leibovitz 
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). The recontextualization of 
a single object in frame in Figure 9 is reminiscent of Jeff Koons’ copying of one element 
of Andrea Blanch’s fashion photograph in Koons II. 
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substantiality taken, but there are also important policy arguments 
concerning free speech and democratic participation with prominent 
cultural symbols that should be considered by courts adjudicating 
widespread digital repurposing of mediated works. 
D. Effect on Market and Potential Market for the Work 
Despite the dominance of transformative use doctrine that un-
derpinned the first factor over almost three decades, the fourth factor 
has enjoyed a resurgence, and is considered “ the most important” 
fair use factor. 240 The interaction between the first and the fourth 
factors does implicitly suggest the doctrinal primacy of the fourth 
factor as the focus is ultimately on the economic impact on the de-
mand for the original work and its derivatives.241 Ginsburg notes 
that the dominant role of transformative use doctrine under the first 
factor appears to be giving way to a more fulsome consideration of 
the statutory factors, and a renewed emphasis on the fourth factor in 
particular,242 citing TCA v. McCollum as an example of the Second 
Circuit’s willingness to engage in textual analysis as a demonstra-
tion of this increasingly skeptical approach to purportedly trans-
formative uses and their market effects.243 
 
240 See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 662 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (1985)). 
241 See e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
242 Other academics have noted the risk of allowing transformativeness under the first 
factor to dominate the market harm analysis under the fourth. See e.g., Beebe, supra note 
89, at 588–91 (discussing the “stampeding” of the four factors); Ginsburg, supra note 93, 
at 287 (“The formula ‘if transformative work/purpose, then no market harm’ meets its 
corollary: ‘If commercial and not transformative, then market harm.’ Thus, fair use 
continues to reduce to a one-factor test, but one that cuts both ways.”). 
243 Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 287. Ginsburg also emphasizes a renewed consideration 
of the “value” of the work separate from the market harm analysis, considering its effects 
on the monopoly-incentive structure established under copyright. Interestingly, meme 
usage of well-known works may actually benefit the underlying copyright. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, widespread usage in memes of a well-known work may enhance the 
value of the copyright. Fromer similarly comments that secondary uses that transform the 
original can have positive effects on the copyrighted work’s value that should be relevant 
under the fair use analysis, as these uses “can draw attention to, enhance, or affirm the 
work’s role in the marketplace.” Fromer, supra note 134, at 630. 
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Internet memes tend to be highly transformative under the first 
factor, thus reducing their relevant fourth factor market impacts.244 
Memes neither create a market substitute for the original nor in-
fringe directly on the exclusive rights to authorize derivative works, 
as no real licensing market exists for memes. Applying his social 
semiotics framework to the market effects of potential licensing 
markets for originals under the fourth factor, Holland argues that 
“[w]hen the flow of discourse around the subsequent work moves 
significantly outside these dominant structures and constraints [pre-
sent in the original work], these markets are less foreseeable.”245 
Even where licensing markets may exist, such as the underlying 
photographs in Figures 5-9, this means that the relevant derivative 
and licensing markets are constrained to secondary works and uses 
that make use of the original within the semiotic constraints of its 
original purpose and character; seemingly a restatement of trans-
formative use doctrine, but one that actively reframes the analysis 
as one which explicitly recognizes the role of audience discourse 
and interaction with the work. 
The Oprah memes in Figures 1-4 do not produce a market alter-
native for Oprah’s talk show, nor is there any evidence that the in-
creased exposure of her car giveaway led to any relevant market 
harms for the copyright in Oprah Winfrey’s talk show. The stock 
image used in Figure 5 was ostensibly produced for uses on com-
mercial websites, news sites, and other licensed digital uses, a well-
established market. Likewise, the paparazzo photo depicted in Fig-
ure 6 would ostensibly be licensed for use in tabloids and celebrity 
news websites. In Brammer, the Fourth Circuit considered the direct 
reproduction of a photo used exclusively and expressly for its con-
tents—the depiction of the Adams Morgan neighborhood.246 Wisely 
rejecting the defendant’s argument that the “informational” use was 
transformative of the original purpose, the court cautioned that such 
 
244 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (“[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication 
of the entirety of an original, it clearly “supersede[s] the objects,” of the original and serves 
as a market replacement for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original 
will occur. But when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market substitution 
is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”). 
245 Holland, supra note 66, at 388–89. 
246 Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d. 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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a broad application of transformative use doctrine would effectively 
remove copyright protection from photographs and that Violent 
Hues impermissibly intruded upon Brammer’s licensing market.247 
Secondary uses of licensable photographs such as memes are easily 
distinguished from the commercial use in Brammer. Under a semi-
otic analysis, the Distracted Boyfriend Exploitable meme and 
Rhianna’s Dress Edits exist far outside the textual constraints of the 
original works, and audience engagement in recoding and recontex-
tualizing these works for a discursive purpose has moved far beyond 
the foreseeable markets for those works.248 While a renewed empha-
sis on the fourth factor jeopardizes marginally-transformative uses 
or those with discernable market impacts, this fact favors Image 
Macro, Edits and Exploitable memes, in part due to their transform-
ativeness, and in part because they produce no competing substitute 
for the original work. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Social media today invariably enable and encourage the creation 
of individuated online identities through repetition, reproduction, 
and remixing. Marshall astutely observes that we are collectively 
reconstituted as intercommunicated public personas online249 and 
our online persona is “a projection of our self for particular and di-
rected purposes . . . derived from the archive of material that circu-
lates around our online activity.”250 Jurgenson similarly notes that 
social media has resulted in “calculated avatar performance”251 and 
that the social media profile emerges as a kind of library to make 
our pasts accessible and (equally important) to give ourselves an 
 
247 Id. at 264. 
248 It is not a relevant market harm that a transformative secondary use may eclipse the 
market for the original work, as appears to have happened to the stock image featured in 
Distracted Boyfriend as a result of audience association with the meme format. See e.g., 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (“The cognizable harm is market substitution, not any harm 
from criticism. As to parody pure and simple, it is unlikely that the work will act as a 
substitute for the original, since the two works usually serve different market functions.”). 
249 THE CELEBRITY PERSONA PANDEMIC, supra note 1,at 71. 
250 Id. at 73–74. 
251 JURGENSON, supra note 13, at 72. 
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order.”252 Put in a different way, we are all using a mélange of  
images, text, and videos—comprising self-generated and infringing 
works—for the purposes of constructing this intercommunicated 
public persona that participates in an online environment that is 
characterized by anti-ideology and anti-authority features.  
It is worthwhile taking a parting look at a recent internet meme 
that has taken the world by storm. The photograph by Getty photog-
rapher Brendan Smialowski of Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, 
a former presidential candidate, sitting comfortably masked, cross-
legged and bundled up in a bulky coat with garish oversized mittens, 
at President Joe Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021, has cap-
tured the imagination of netizens as the image is inserted into a pan-
oply of famous scenarios and everyday situations that include being 
on the USS Enterprise in Star Trek, at The Last Supper, sitting with 
Forrest Gump on a bench, and having a conference with the super-
hero group The Avengers.253 “Bernie Sanders Wearing Mittens Sit-
ting in a Chair” has been expressed as Image Macro and Exploitable 
memes,254 and Nick Swahney, an N.Y.U. student had created an app 
that allowed users to drop the Bernie Sanders image into any loca-
tion in the world.255 The original photograph depicts a down-to-earth 
dowdy Sanders who values comfort over style, and is confidently 
unperturbed by what people may think of his appearance (Figure 
10). The different versions of the meme shown below play with the 
Sanders image showing how at home the nonplussed senator can be 
in all these ridiculous scenarios, thus repurposing the original work 
which Smialowski confessed did not have any particular meaning to 
it. “I saw Sen. Sanders out of my other eye kind of fiddling with his 
 
252 Id. at 85. 
253 Mike Ives and Daniel Victor, Bernie Sanders Is Once Again the Star of a Meme, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/21/us/politics/bernie-sanders-
meme.html [https://perma.cc/8HBN-CT4X].  
254 Bernie Sanders Wearing Mittens Sitting in a Chair, KNOW YOUR MEME (Jan. 21, 
2021), https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/bernie-sanders-wearing-mittens-sitting-in-a-
chair#fn1 [https://perma.cc/5T63-FXC6].  
255 The app has been discontinued, but almost 10 million Bernie Sanders memes had been 
created. Nick Sawhney, Put Bernie Anywhere!, BERNIE-SITS.HEROKUPAPP.COM, 
http://bernie-sits.herokuapp.com/ [https://perma.cc/J8RE-7U99]. See also Megan Graham, 
How to Put Bernie Sanders Into Any Shot on Google Maps Street View or Snapchat, CNBC 
(Jan. 21, 2021, 3:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/21/how-to-put-bernie-sanders-
into-google-maps-street-view-or-snapchat-.html [https://perma.cc/V88X-TVKG].  
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gloves. It was just a nice moment when he crossed his legs and 
crossed his arms,” Smialowski said. “I threw the camera over to 
him.”256 When asked why he thought the photograph of Sanders  
resulting in the meme becoming an internet sensation so quickly, 
Smialowski replied, “Sen. Sanders has a very well-defined brand 
and image. He is who he is and he’s comfortable in that and it’s very 
much part of his politics.”257  
Sanders entered into a licensing agreement with Getty Images to 
sell merchandise bearing the Bernie Sanders meme, including  
T-shirts, sweatshirts and stickers, on his campaign website with the 
money going to charitable organizations.258 Getty Images also con-
firmed that it will donate its proceeds from the licensing agreement 
to Meals on Wheels of America.259 While the online sharing of the 
Bernie Sanders image as Image Macro and Exploitable memes is 
arguably transformative,260 the reproduction of the memes on an  
assortment of merchandise261—in particular, only the image of 
Sanders sitting in a chair—may tilt the scales against a finding of 
fair use as there would be an adverse impact on the commercial  
licensing market currently exploited by Getty Images. By moving 
into the physical world of merchandising, one has exited the digital 
carnivalesque in which greater permissibility is accorded to 
 
256 Hannah Miao, ‘It’s Just Bernie Being Bernie’—How a Photo of Sanders Wearing 




258 Chairman Sanders Crewneck, BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN STORE (Jan. 21, 2021), 
https://store.berniesanders.com/products/chairman-sanders-
crewneck?variant=32787050004551 [https://perma.cc/3WUR-6YJZ]. 
259 Lisa Rathke, Bernie Sanders’ Inauguration Mittens, Memes Help Raise $1.8M for 
Charity, ABC13 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Jan. 27, 2021), https://abc13.com/bernie-sanders-
mittens-meme-at-biden-inauguration-best-memes-buzzfeed-origin/10073344/ 
[htpps://perma.cc/M5MY-LWEM].  
260 See the discussion supra Section III.A. 
261 Kala Herh and Zoe Malin, 10 Funny Gifts Inspired by the Bernie Sanders Mittens 
Meme, NBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2021, 4:42PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/shopping/gift-
guides/bernie-mittens-meme-gifts-n1256020 [htpps://perma.cc/3QZX-8X78]; Nicole 
Goodkind, As the Meme Turns: Bernie with Mittens Merch Has Dropped, FORTUNE (Jan. 
22, 2021, 7:17 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/01/22/bernie-sanders-inauguration-mittens-
meme-merch/ [https://perma.cc/6YGN-6AGB].  
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transformative play and entered the realm where the hegemony of 































Senator Bernie Sanders on USS Enterprise in Star Trek263 
 
262 Bernie Sanders Wearing Mittens Sitting in a Chair, supra note 254. 
263   Id. 
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Figure 12 
Senator Bernie Sanders in the Distracted Boyfriend Meme264 
 
Figure 13 
Senator Bernie Sanders with The Avengers265 
 
Each meme on a Facebook or Twitter profile could function like 
our own user-generated content, and “place each moment in a nar-
rative with a point of view and a purpose, more like a memoir with 
 
264 @ashtroid22, TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2021) https://twitter.com/ashtroid22/status/ 
1352079682137583616/photo/2 [https://perma.cc/K8Y5-NYBK]. 
265 @AshleyKSmalls, TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2021) https://twitter.com/AshleyKSmalls/ 
status/1352099922988961792/photo/1 [https://perma.cc/DMT4-XYUH]. 
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a grand narrative.”266 Unsurprisingly, memes, with their rich semi-
otic connotations, are popularly used for the purpose of creating, 
maintaining and remaking of a digital public persona, and should 
generally qualify as highly transformative secondary uses that re-
purpose copyrighted works in a digital medium. Each sign is assim-
ilated into the carnival language with its meanings changed and ex-
ploited in a multitude of heterogeneous layers. In this carnivalesque 
environment, they may be employed for discursive activities—such 
as using an Oprah meme to humorously comment on the COVID-
19 pandemic or gay marriage—or just simply employed to amplify 
one’s emotion at a particular moment in time much like writing a 
digital diary on social media. In the context of an interconnected 
networked community in the 21st century, there is significant public 
benefit or public interest in recognizing memes as part of our new 
international cultural vocabulary and multi-directional discourse 
that has engendered important “group-based and society-based pub-
lic interests.”267 In the words of Shifman, “[c]opies become, in this 
sense, more important than the ‘original’: They are the raison d’etre 
of digital communication.”268 
The authors acknowledge that it is always a risky venture to en-
gage in a preliminary interdisciplinary exploration of linguistic, cul-
tural, political, and legal concepts, and there is more work to be done 
in this regard. In Bakhtin’s utopia of bourgeois frivolity, the work 
of the imagination is the most important social asset as carnival and 
communication are inextricably intertwined in transgressive play 
which celebrates “the joyful relativity of all hierarchical, authoritar-
ian structures.”269 The phenomena of meme sharing and other social 
media activities indeed exist in a digital dialogized carnival charac-
terized by the laughing, material and game cultures. Like in Bakh-
tin’s carnival where “[d]egrees of transgression were bound by per-
fectly applied choreographic rules”,270 transgressive infringing uses 
of works protected by copyright are only permissible according to 
 
266 JURGENSON, supra note 13, at 88. 
267 Sun, supra note 21, at 151. Sun also argues that one may treat fair use as a “collective 
user right.” Id. at 168–69. 
268 Shifman, supra note 156, at 373. 
269 Gardiner, supra note 42, at 30. 
270 Lachmann, supra note 7, at 118. 
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the legal rules of fair use. This Article does not contend that there 
should be a per se rule that all internet memes are fair use. Fair use 
ought to be found for most private individuals using memes, but the 
finding may not be as certain for influencers on social media who 
gain a commercial benefit from their social media account or for 
multinational corporations seeking to capitalize on popular iconic 
works for profit. In line with the decisions in cases such as Blanch, 
Cariou, and Seltzer, the transformative use analysis applied by the 
Second and Ninth Circuits appears to be able to protect a kaleido-
scope of memes from copyright infringement liability so long as a 
recoding or repurposing of the original can “reasonably be per-
ceived.” The flexibility of the fair use analysis enables U.S. courts 
to develop jurisprudence surrounding memes in a way that reflects 
their social value in this new digital age. By accommodating trans-
formative digital uses such as memes under fair use, courts can bet-
ter balance between copyright holders’ exclusive rights and breath-
ing space within the confines of copyright law all within this playful 
digital carnivalesque. 
